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Introduction
The importance of the emerging economies to firms in the western
world has increased exponentially over recent years; these markets provide
huge opportunities for sales and potential for growth. Since Goldman
Sachs invented the BRIC acronym in 2001 to describe Brazil, Russia, India,
and China, the economies of those countries have run well ahead of the
bank's expectations.' As the importance of the BRIC economies continues
to grow, and more transactions have some connection to these jurisdic-
tions, so too will the impact of their merger regimes.
Each of the BRIC countries has adopted an antitrust regime that regu-
lates mergers. While Russia and Brazil have had a merger regime since
1991 and 1994, respectively, 2 the Indian and Chinese regimes are newer. 3
1. Special Report on Globalisation: The New Champions, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 2008,
at 3 ("In 2001 Goldman Sachs had predicted that by the end of the decade the BRIC
economies would account for 10% of global GDP at purchasing-power parity (PPP); by
2007 their share was already 14%.").
2. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (OECD), MINISTRY OF THE RussAN FEDERA-
TION, ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RussL~A FEDERATION
IN 1999 1-2 (1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/7/2406707.pdf;
OECD, COMPETITION LAW & POLICY IN BRAZIL: A PEER REVIEW 13 (2005) [hereinafter
OECD BRAZIL REPORT], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/45/35445196.
pdf (stating that Brazil's antitrust regime was introduced in 1962 but did not incorpo-
rate a merger regime until 1994).
3. See Rajiv K. Luthra & G.R. Bhatia, India, in GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., THE HAND-
BOOK OF COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2009, at 137, 132 (2009), available at
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/handbooks/1 5/the-handbook-competition-
enforcement-agencies-2009; Liz McKenzie, Coca-Cola to Test China's New Antitrust Laws,
COMPETITION LAw 360, Sept. 8, 2008, available at http://www.law360.?com/articles/
68536. India's first competition law, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act
(MRTPA) was enacted in 1969; this law was replaced by the Competition Act, 2002,
No. 12 of 2003, as amended by The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007. Atleen Kaur,
Competition Laws in the Lands of Tigers and Dragons, MICHIGAN B.J., Sept. 2008, at 34, 35.
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Nonetheless, all but India, where the merger legislation has not yet come
into effect, appear to be active. 4 For example, Conselho Administrativo de
Defesa EconOmica (CADE), the Brazilian antitrust agency, recently disal-
lowed an acquisition in the cement market5 and intervened in the Sky-
DirecTV transaction, where it imposed regulatory-style limitations on the
ability of the acquirer to exercise management control over the combined
entity.6 The Russian Federal Anti-monopoly Service (FAS) in 2008 and
2009 disallowed Google's acquisition of ZAO Begun 7 and Disney's joint
venture with Media-One, 8 challenged an acquisition by Carlsberg in the
Russian beer market,9 and ordered the divestiture of a controlling interest
in a petroleum drilling platform manufacturer. 10 Since the entry into force
of China's first comprehensive competition law, the Anti-Monopoly Law
(AML) in 2008, the Chinese merger agency has both imposed conditions
on, and prohibited, transactions;" conditions were imposed for the first
China's competition law, the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), came into effect in August,
2008. Id. at 35; see also infra note 59.
4. See Luthra & Bhatia, supra note 3 ("India is on the threshold of ushering in a
modernised competition regime .... ).
5. CADE Obriga Votorantim a Vender Fibricas de Concreto na Regiao Sul [CADE
Requires Votorantim to Downsize Concrete Assets], VALOR ECONOMICO (Braz.), Mar. 20,
2008 (noting that CADE required Engemix to divest certain Brazilian concrete plants).
6. This transaction combined the two largest paid television companies using
"direct-to-home" technology, resulting in both horizontal overlaps and a vertical relation-
ship. The primary concern was the horizontal concentration in the paid television mar-
ket. However, CADE also had concerns regarding the vertical relationships. Therefore,
it required the seller, active on the downstream market, to relinquish rights in the
merged entity. Further, it placed restrictions on Fox's ability to acquire certain input
into media content in the domestic market. See Tulio Coelho & Alessandro Martins,
Brazil, in GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., THE HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AGEN-
ciES 2008, at 34, 40-41 (2008), available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/
reviews/7/the-handbook-competition-enforcement-agencies-2008.
7. Melissa Lipman, Russian Regulator Squashes Google Takeover Bid, COMPETITION
LAW 360, Oct. 24, 2008, available at http://www.law360.com/articles/73991.
8. Ron Knox, Typos Thwart Russian Media Mergers, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV.,
May 7, 2009, available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/
13374.
9. FAS challenged both Carlsberg's acquisition of 50% of Baltika via its acquisition
of Scottish & Newcastle and its ubsequent offer to purchase the remaining 50% from
Baltic Beverages Holding. On March 25, 2008, FAS found that the acquisition would
give Carlsberg control of over 35% of the Russian beer market, sufficient to gain market
dominance. FAS imposed behavioral conditions on the merged entity, requiring that
Carlsberg inform FAS of any material changes in sales policy, or any price increase or
decrease in excess of 10%. Carlsberg is also prohibited from restricting supply on the
basis of territory or turnover and must not refuse to supply its products without suffi-
cient justification. Other restrictive distributive practices are also prohibited. See Russia
Puts Conditions on Carlsberg/Baltika, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., Mar. 25, 2008,
available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/10156/russia-puts-
conditions-carlsberg-baltika.
10. See Russia Unwinds Engineering Merger, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., Feb. 5,
2008, available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/10358/
russia-unwinds-engineering-merger.
11. As of April 27, 2009, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) had received fifty-
one merger filing notifications, forty-two of which it had investigated. See [The Three
Anti-Monopoly Agencies Recap the One-Year AML Enforcement Experience; New Implement-
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time on the clearance of the InBev/Anheuser-Busch merger,1 2 followed four
months later by the agency's first prohibition decision, in relation to Coca-
Cola's planned acquisition of a domestic juice manufacturer. 13
In this article we describe and compare the procedural and substan-
tive aspects of each of the BRIC merger regimes, including issues such as
jurisdiction, standard of review, third party involvement, remedies, and
sanctions. 14 Importantly, we do not attempt to assess the success of the
various regimes or their enforcement agencies. At least the Indian and Chi-
nese regimes' 5 are sufficiently new that it would be both difficult and
unfair to award grades at this stage. 16
ing Rules Will Be Forthcoming], ECONOMIC OBSERVER ONLINE (P.R.C.), May 19, 2009, avail-
able at http://www.eeo.com.cn/eeo/jjgcb/2009/05/18/137747.shtml.
12. On November 18, 2008, MOFCOM issued its decision, stating that the acquisi-
tion would not eliminate or restrict competition in China's beer market. Nevertheless, it
added that, given the large scale of the acquisition and the strong market share and
market position of the combined group, conditions would be imposed to minimize
potentially adverse effects on China's beer market in the future as follows: (1) Anheuser-
Busch's existing 27% stake in Tsingdao Brewery may not be increased; (2) lnBev must
notify MOFCOM in a timely manner if there is any change in its controlling sharehold-
ers, or the shareholders of such controlling shareholders; (3) InBev must not increase its
existing 28.56% stake in Zhujiang Brewery; and (4) InBev must not hold any stake in
China Resources Snow Breweries or Beijing Yanjing Brewery, two other major breweries
in China. InBev is required to notify, and to obtain prior approval from, MOFCOM
before seeking to take any such steps. MOFCOM Announcement No. 95 of 2008,
MOFCOM Decision Regarding InBev Group's Acquisition of Anheuser-Busch (Nov. 18,
2008), available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200811/20081105899216.
html?3815482743=3683028003.
13. Coca-Cola announced plans to acquire Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd. on September
3, 2008. See McKenzie, supra note 3. Coca-Cola submitted its merger filing notification
on September 18, 2008, and on March 18, 2009, MOFCOM published its prohibition
decision after discussions with Coca-Cola with respect to potential conditions had
failed. MOFCOM identified the following concerns in its decision: (1) Coca-Cola would
have gained the ability to leverage its dominant position in the carbonated drinks market
over the juice market; (2) the increase in entry barriers due to Coca-Cola's control over
the juice brands 'Minute Maid' and 'Huiyuan'; and (3) squeezing of the ability of domes-
tic small- and mid-sized juice producers to compete effectively and to innovate.
MOFCOM Announcement No. 22 of 2009, MOFCOM Decision Regarding Coca-Cola's
Acquisition of Huiyuan Juice Group, Ltd. (Mar. 18, 2009) [hereinafter MOFCOM
Announcement No. 22 of 2009], available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/20
0903/20090306108494.html?376087927=3683028003.
14. This article is not a substitute for research when confronted with a specific trans-
action. Regulations change often, and even where there has been no change, interpreta-
tion may differ. This is true of mature agencies, but it is particularly true with new
regimes where practices may not be firmly established.
15. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16. Although Brazil has had a competition policy for almost five decades, it is not
much more advanced than the other competition regimes discussed in this article.
CADE was created in 1962 when Brazil's first competition law was enacted. See gener-
ally OECD BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 2. The pervasive state control of the economy and
the limitation of CADE's jurisdiction to the private sector dramatically limited the scope
of an effective competition policy. In response to severe inflation, the so-called "Real
Plan" was instituted in 1994. Reform of competition policy, including the enactment of
the new Law 8884 (BAL), was part of these economic reforms in the hope that invigo-
rated competition enforcement might restrain inflation. These changes included a new
"troika" of agencies and a merger regulation. Since 1994, there have been two revisions
of the law (in 1999 and 2000), which instituted a merger fee and increased investigative
Vol. 43
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Grading is nonetheless important. Almost 100 jurisdictions world-
wide now have some form of competition regime in place; since the so-
called "globalization of competition enforcement," many conferences and
publications have featured the work of the new regimes, giving rise to the
view that competition policy is indeed global. 17 While it is true that there
are many more competition enforcement agencies in the world today than
fifteen years ago, the number of countries with effective competition
enforcement programs remains small.' Many agencies attend interna-
tional meetings, charge fees for notifications, support segments of their
local legal professions, and generate paper, but otherwise do little. 19 It will
be important to see whether the BRIC agencies join the larger group of
competition drones or seek admission to the much smaller fraternity of
true competition regimes.
1. Background
A. Legislative History and Institutions
The BRIC merger regimes are at different stages of development and
have in place different systems of agency organization. Other than Brazil,
each BRIC country has given one administrative body jurisdiction to
review mergers. 20
powers, among other things. During the tenure of Dr. Gesner Jose de Oliveira Filho as
CADE President during the 1990s, many, including your senior author, anticipated that
Brazil might become the model for competition policy among emerging economies. Suf-
fice it to say, this did not happen. Despite Dr. Oliveira's leadership, the legal structure,
including the "troika" of agencies and institutional design, doomed this development.
See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Michael D. Hausfeld, Global Enforcement of Anticompetitive Conduct, 10
SEDONA CONF. J. 9, 9 (2009) (noting the global reach of competition laws and collecting
sources on competition laws of different countries); David Lewis, Introduction, in THE
HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2009, supra note 3 (noting that
ninety-three jurisdictions are members of the International Competition Network (ICN),
which provides competition agencies from developed and developing nations with a net-
work for addressing enforcement and policy issues of common concern).
18. See William E. Kovacic, General Counsel, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Pres-
entation at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: Extraterri-
toriality, Institutions, and Convergence in International Competition Policy 1-3 (Apr. 5,
2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/031210kovacic.pdf ("Many anti-
trust laws lack effective implementation.").
19. See generally Kenneth M. Davidson, Creating Effective Competition Institutions:
Ideas for Transitional Economies, 6 AstAN PAC L. & POL'Y J. 3, 3 n.2 (2005) (noting the
existence of the ICN, the OECD, and several other conferences to discuss the establish-
ment of competition agencies in transitional economies); see also id. at 73-74 (noting
that many circumstances in developing economies impede the formation of effective
competition agencies).
20. It should be noted that China also has multiple competition enforcement agen-
cies, albeit only the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of MOFCOM has responsibility for merger
review. Nonetheless, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) has
jurisdiction over non-price related monopoly agreements, non-price related abuses of
dominant market position, administrative monopolies, and other acts that restrict or
eliminate competition; and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)
has jurisdiction over the investigation and regulation of price related monopoly agree-
ments and abuses of a dominant market position. An antitrust commission has also
Cornell International Law Journal
1. Brazil. The principal competition merger legislation is Law
8884/94 (BAL), enacted in 1994.21 Brazil is unusual because responsibil-
ity for merger review is split among three different agencies: (1) the Secreta-
riat of Economic Law (SDE), which is part of the Ministry of Justice and is
responsible for the legal investigation into a transaction;22 (2) the Secreta-
riat for Economic Monitoring (SEAE), which is part of the Ministry of
Finance and is responsible for the economic investigation into a transac-
tion;2 3 and (3) CADE, which is an independent administrative tribunal
responsible for the final decision; CADE's decisions are not subject to
review by the Executive. 2 4 This troika of agencies is referred to collectively
as the Sistema Brasiliero de Defesa de Concorrencia.25
CADE is governed by a council of six commissioners and a president
that is appointed by the President of the Republic of Brazil and approved by
the national senate, each for a term of two years.26 The commissioners
been set up under the State Council to: (1) conduct research and draft policies relating
to competition; (2) organize investigations and evaluations of overall market competi-
tion; (3) formulate and publish antitrust guidelines; and (4) coordinate the enforcement
of the AML. The commission is headed by Vice-Premier Wang Qishan, who would likely
be in a position to mitigate friction and inconsistencies arising from the parallel enforce-
ment of the AML by each of NDRC, MOFCOM and SAIC in their respective substantive
areas. See Yijun Tian, The Impacts of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law on IP Commercializa-
tion in China & General Strategies for Technology-Driven Companies and Future Regula-
tors, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 004, 1 14 (2010); see also Dina Kallay, Counsel for I.P.
and International Antitrust, U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Remarks at the Melbourne
Law School Conference: Unleashing the Tiger? Competition Law in China and Hong
Kong: China's New Anti-Monopoly Law: An International Antitrust Convergence Per-
spective 1 (Oct. 4, 2008).
21. See Lei No. 8884, de 11 dejunho de 1994 [Brazilian Antitrust Law (BAL)], D.O.
de 13.06.1994, art. 54, amended by Lei No. 10149, de 21 de dezembro de 2000. Article
54 of the BAL governs mergers, acquisitions, and similar transactions: "Any acts that
may limit or otherwise restrain open competition, or that result in the control of relevant
markets for certain products or services, shall be submitted to CADE for review." Id.
22. SDE also performs some preliminary enforcement functions, and is headed by a
Secretary appointed by the Minister of Justice. It is divided into two Departments, of
which the Department of Economic Protection and Defense (DPDE) is responsible for
competition law. The DPDE is headed by an appointee of the Secretary. Although SDE
is not an independent agency, the Secretary's decisions "cannot be appealed to higher
ranks in the Justice Ministry." Traditionally, the Ministry has not interfered in SDE's
activities. OECD BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 49-50.
23. SEAE is headed by an appointee of the Minister of Finance, and is responsible for
providing a technical analysis report to SDE. SEAE has authority to employ all the inves-
tigative powers available to SDE but does not have any adjudicatory or enforcement func-
tions under the competition law. See id. at 50.
24. CADE adjudicates alleged violations of the law and imposes appropriate reme-
dies and fines. It was established as "a federal independent agency." See BAL art. 3.
The SEAE prepares an initial non-binding economic analysis and the SDE prepares its
non-binding substantive analysis. Both agencies then submit a report and recommenda-
tion to CADE, which issues the final decision. Brazil: Questions and Answers, in GLOBAL
COMPETITION REv., THE HANDBOOK ON COMPETITION EcONoMics 2009, at 32, 33 (2009),
available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/_files/_handbooks/_18/gcr-hce
09_qa brazil.pdf.
25. Secretaria de Acompanhamento Econ6mico-SEAE-Glosshrios-Sistema Brasi-
leiro de Defesa da ConcorrEncia, http://www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/central-documentos/
glossarios.
26. BAL art. 4.
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may be reappointed for one additional term. 2 7 In its 2005 review of the
agency, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) reported the view in the Brazilian competition community that
politics, rather than expertise, characterized most appointments to the
council. 28 Nonetheless, there is some disagreement on this issue; a num-
ber of practitioners take the view that such politicization has not affected
CADE.2 9
A bill currently pending before the Brazilian congress (Antitrust Bill) 30
would extend the terms of office to four years but would preclude reap-
pointment for a consecutive term. 3 1 The President of the Republic of Brazil
would appoint the CADE President and the commissioners to the council,
after their approval by the senate. 3 2 The Antitrust Bill explicitly provides
for staggered commissioner appointments. 33
27. See id. Appointees must be citizens, over thirty years of age and "reputed for
their legal or economic knowledge...." Id. They may be removed from office only for
certain criminal offenses or other malfeasance. Id. art. 5. Members of CADE, while in
office, may not undertake outside employment (except of an academic nature) or engage
in political activities. See id. art. 6. BAL further provides for the involvement in CADE's
activities of two independent officers. Id. arts. 10, 12. The CADE Attorney General is
appointed by the Minister of Justice and commissioned by the President of Brazil after
Senate approval. Id. art. 11. The Attorney General serves under the same conditions
that apply to Commissioners with respect to term of office, qualifications, re-appoint-
ment, and removal. Id. The Attorney General's statutory duties are to provide legal
advice to CADE, render opinions on cases pending before CADE for judgment, defend
the agency in court, arrange for judicial execution of its decisions, and, with CADE's
preliminary approval, enter into settlements of cases pending in court. Id. art 10. The
Attorney General of the Republic appoints the second officer to handle cases submitted
to CADE for review. Id. art. 12. CADE may request that the Attorney General Office of
the Republic enforce CADE decisions in court. Id.
28. OECD BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 45.
29. Interview with Marcello Calliari of Tozzini, Freire, Teixeira e Silva Advogados
(Feb. 26, 2009).
30. Decreto No. 5877/05, de 17 de agosto de 2006 [Antitrust Bill], D.O.U. de
18.08.2006 (Braz.). The Antitrust Bill was endorsed by CADE. See David Thorley,
CADE Okays Competition Bill, GLOBAL COMPETITION REv., Apr. 7, 2009, available at http:/
/www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/13203/cade-okays-competition-bill.
The Antitrust Bill has been approved by the Brazilian House of Representatives and is
awaiting approval in the Senate. Carlos Francisco de Magalhes & Gabriel Nogueira
Dias, Brazil, in THE HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 2009, supra note
3, at 33, 34. There have been reports that approval could come by the end of 2010. Ron
Knox, Brazil Nearing Single-Enforcer System, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., Apr. 23 2010,
available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/28340. If approved
by the Senate, the Antitrust Bill shall replace the BAL. The Senate has not yet said
whether it will submit the Antitrust Bill to public consultation or if it will accept com-
ments from interested third parties, although it has consulted with certain government
officials, attorneys in private practice and economists. The Antitrust Bill proposes sev-
eral reforms to the BAL, including introduction of a mandatory pre-merger notification
regime, fixed deadlines, and an expedited merger review process. Brazilian Antitrust
Reform Gains Momentum, GLOBAL COMPETITION REv., Dec. 19, 2008, available at http://
www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/12491. It would also modify the noti-
fication thresholds. See infra notes 103, 105 and accompanying text.
31. Antitrust Bill art. 6(1).
32. Id. art. 6.
33. Id.
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The most dramatic change proposed by the Antitrust Bill is the aboli-
tion of the SDE 3 4 and the reduction of the powers of the SEAE.3 5 Under
the provisions of the Antitrust Bill, the SEAE would focus principally on
competition advocacy, rather than conducting economic investigations into
each transaction.36 The SEAE would thus no longer provide an opinion in
all merger cases, but instead could opine on a matter on its own motion or
when asked to do so by the Directorate General or the reporting
commissioner. 3 7
2. Russia. The Russian Law on Protection of Competition (LPC)
entered into force on October 26, 2006.38 The LPC governs merger control
in commodity and financial markets. 3 9 FAS, together with its local agen-
cies, enforces the provisions of the LPC;40 there are local agencies in
eighty-two of the eighty-three Russian constituent geographic areas. 4 1 FAS
is divided into a number of departments and offices responsible for the
enforcement of specific laws.4 2 Enforcement is divided among several
departments responsible for particular sectors of the economy: (1) fuel and
energy; (2) electric power; (3) transport and communications; (4) con-
struction, environment and natural resources; (5) industry; and (6) agricul-
34. Under the Antitrust Bill, SDE would be incorporated into CADE, becoming a
Directorate General. Francisco de Magalhdes & Nogueira Dias, supra note 30, at 34.
The Director General would be appointed by the President of the Republic of Brazil, after
approval by the senate, for a two-year term with the possibility of reappointment for one
term. Antitrust Bill art. 12(2).
35. Id. art. 19; see also Brazilian Antitrust Reform Gains Momentum, GLOBAL COMPETI-
TION REV., Dec. 19, 2008, available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/
article/12491.
36. Antitrust Bill art. 19. CADE would continue to be an independent administrative
tribunal, but would accumulate-after the incorporation of the SDE-the responsibilities
for investigating and judging cases. Francisco de Magalhaes & Nogueira Dias, supra
note 30, at 34.
37. Id.
38. Sobranie Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation
Collection of Legislation] 2006, No. 135-FZ, July 26, 2006 [hereinafter LPC], available at
http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/legislation/26940.shtml. The LPC was subsequently
amended in July 2009; these amendments came into effect in August 2009. Sobranie
Zakonodatel'stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection'of Legisla-
tion] 2009, No. 164-FZ, July 17, 2009, available at http://www.rg.ru/2009/07/23/
izmeneniya-dok.html.
39. The LPC replaced two separate laws on financial and commodity markets (Law
No. 948-1 and Law No. 117-FZ), which cast a wider net. The LPC is expected to increase
efficiency and reduce the number of filings in comparison to the previous regime, thus
enabling FAS to focus on transactions that raise substantive concerns. The LPC also sets
out precise filing and review procedures, providing greater certainty to parties.
40. FAS was established in 2004 as the successor to the Russian Soviet Federative
Socialist Republic State Committee for Antimonopoly Policy and Support for New Eco-
nomic Structures, which was founded in 1990. Natalia Ivolgina & Tapani Manninen,
Russian Competition Law: Overview and Recent Developments, in GLOBAL COMPETITION
REv., THE EUROPEAN ANnTIRUST REviEW 2010 (2010), available at http://www.globalcom-
petitionreview.com/reviews/19/sections/69/chapters/773/russia.
41. Id.
42. Consumer protection, advertising, and investments in companies having strate-
gic importance for the defense of the country. See OECD, COMPETITION LAW & POLICY IN
RUSSIA: A PEER REviEw 45 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/60/
32005515.pdf.
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ture, chemicals, and use of natural resources. 43 This structure is thought
to allow staff members to gain greater expertise in the area in which they
are enforcing the law than under the previous structure, which divided
enforcement among the different substantive areas of the law (anticompeti-
tive agreements, abuse of dominance, and merger control).4 4
Each local agency is responsible for enforcement in a particular con-
stituent geographic area of the Russian Federation where it also partici-
pates in analytical work, policy development, and prognosis of economic
conditions. 45 Specific administrative regulations establish whether a case
shall be referred to the relevant local agency or the central office of FAS. 4
6
For example, the central office must conduct merger reviews above certain
asset thresholds.4 7 In other respects, the local agencies act fairly indepen-
dently-methodological recommendations and other documents issued by
FAS guide the agencies, but they do not need to seek permissions or
approvals in individual cases. 48 Nonetheless, FAS has the right to reverse
the decision or order of a local agency that is contrary to legislation or
exceeds the authority of the local agency.4 9 In practice, this is a rare occur-
rence and decisions of the local agencies are usually appealed directly to a
local court. 50
3. India. The Competition (Amendment) Act 2007 (CAA) was
enacted in September 2007 and amends the Competition Act 2002, which
in turn replaced the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1969
(MRTPA). 5 1 The provisions of the CAA dealing with mergers and acquisi-
tions have yet to be notified and therefore are not yet in force. 52
The Competition Commission of India (CCI) 5 3 is responsible for
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 45-46.
47. Id. at 46.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Mark Sansom & Priya Christian, India's New Competition Regime: The Ele-
phant Who Became a Tiger, 1 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAc. 62, 62 (2010).
52. Id. The provisions dealing with anticompetitive agreements and abuse of domi-
nant positions (Sections 3 and 4, respectively) were notified and came into force on May
20, 2009. The CCI may therefore now investigate alleged breaches of these sections of
the Competition (Amendment) Act (CAA). See id.
53. Under Chapter III of the CAA, the CCI has a chairperson and two to six other
members. The Competition Act, 2002, No. 12 of 2003, as amended by The Competition
(Amendment) Act, 2007 [hereinafter CAA]; India Code (2003), § 8. The chairperson
and every other member must be a person of ability, integrity, and standing and have
special knowledge of, and at least fifteen years' professional experience in, international
trade, economics, business, commerce, law, finance, accountancy, management, indus-
try, public affairs or competition matters. Id. The chairperson and other members must
have no other occupation. Id. The chairperson and other members of the commission
are appointed by the Central Government from a panel recommended by, in the case of
the chairperson, the Chief Justice, and in the case of the members, (1) the Ministries of
(i) Corporate Affairs and (ii) Law and Justice; and (2) two experts with special knowl-
edge and professional experience in the above fields. Id. § 9. The term of office of the
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enforcing the CAA.5 4 A new chairman of the CCI, together with four addi-
tional members, was appointed in the first half of 2009, and all six of the
CCI positions have now been filled. 55
InJuly 2008, the CCI published revised draft merger regulations (draft
Merger Regulations) under the then-acting Chairman;5 6 however, there has
as yet been no indication as to when the CCI will finalize the draft Merger
Regulations. After the appointment of the new chairman in 2009, the CCI
removed the draft Merger Regulations from its website for further review
and consideration of their potential impact on corporate deals.57 It is
expected that the CCI will further refine the draft Merger Regulations after
carrying out another round of consultations. 58
4. China. The AML came into effect on August 1, 2008. The AML,
among other things, introduced a new merger control regime that applies
equally to domestic and foreign undertakings,5 9 unlike the previous
regime, which applied only to foreign undertakings.60 The Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) remains responsible for enforcing the merger
review process of the AML. 6 1
The government has also issued various secondary legislation; on
August 3, 2008, the Rules on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of
chairperson and other members is five years, and reappointment is possible; however,
office may not be held by any individual past the age of sixty-five years. Id. § 10. The
Central Government also may appoint a Director General to assist the CCI. Id. § 16.
54. CAA § 7(1). It was initially envisaged that on notification and entering into
force of section 66 of the CAA, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commis-
sion (MRTPC), established pursuant to the MRTPA, would cease accepting new cases,
though it would continue to deal with pending cases for a two-year transition period. Id.
§ 66. However, section 66 of the CAA was amended by the Competition (Amendment)
Ordinance, 2009, which was promulgated on October 14, 2009 and provides for the
immediate dissolution of the MRTPC and transfer of all pending antitrust cases to the
Competition Appellate Tribunal. The Competition (Amendment) Ordinance, No. 6 of
2009, available at http://dpal.kar.nic.in/Central%20Acts&Ordinance%20PDF/.%5
Cordi6of2009PR-63.pdf.
55. For details on the fully constituted CCI, see Competition Commission of India,
http://www.cci.gov.in/index.php?option=comcontent&taskview&id=l 17.
56. The CCI published initial draft merger regulations in January 2008.
57. Souvik Sanyal & Gireesh Chandra Prasad, No M&As on Competition Panel's
Plate, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (India), Apr. 15, 2009, available at http://economic-
times.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/No-MAs-on-competition-panels-plate/
articleshow/4402419.cms (indicating that additional consultation is required before the
merger regulations can be finalized).
58. Id. (noting that the CCI looks to "fine tune" its merger regulations).
59. See [Anti-Monopoly Law], (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) (P.R.C.) [hereinafter AML].
60. [Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign
Investors] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, State Administration for Indus-
try and Commerce, State Administration of Taxation, State Administration of Foreign
Exchange, State Administration of State-owned Assets Commission, and Securities Regu-
latory Commission of China, effective September 8, 2006) (P.R.C.).
61. The SAIC, which previously was jointly responsible with MOFCOM for the
merger review process, has ceased to be so responsible under the AML. See GLOBAL
COMPETITION REV., GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2008 83 (2008).
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Undertakings (Rules on Notification Thresholds) came into effect. 62 On
January 7, 2009, MOFCOM issued its Guidance for Notification of Concen-
trations of Undertakings (Procedural Guidance) 6 3 and Guidance for Notifi-
cation Documents and Materials for Concentrations of Undertakings
(Information Requirement Guidance). 64 An accompanying sample notifi-
cation form, the Working Guidance for Notification Review,6 5 and a chart
outlining MOFCOM's merger control review process were issued on Janu-
ary 1, 2009.66 Subsequently, the Guidelines for the Definition of the Rele-
vant Product Market 6 7 were published in July 2009, followed in November
by the Measures on Notification of Concentrations6 8 and the Measures on
Review of Concentrations. 69 This secondary legislation covers matters
ranging from substantive issues such as the definition of the relevant mar-
ket and the scope of a notifiable "concentration of undertakings," to notifi-
cation and review procedures. 70
62. [Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds of Declaration by Business Oper-
ators Concentrations] (promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 1, 2008, effective Aug. 3,
2008) (P.R.C.), available at http://www.isinolaw.com (click "English"; then search for
"Provisions of the State Council on Thresholds of Declaration by Business Operators
Concentrations.").
63. [Guidance for Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings] (promulgated by
the Ministry of Commerce, Jan. 5, 2009, effective Jan. 7, 2009) [hereinafter MOFCOM
Procedural Guidance], available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xgxz/200901/20
090105993824.html?3082164343=3683028003 (P.R.C.).
64. [Guidance for Notification Documents and Materials for Concentrations of
Undertakings] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Jan. 5, 2009, effective Jan. 7,
2009), available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xgxz/200901/20090105993841.
html?2343966839=3683028003 (P.R.C.).
65. [Working Guidance for Notification Review] (promulgated by the Ministry of
Commerce, Jan. 1, 2009) [hereinafter MOFCOM Working Guidance], available at http://
fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xgxz/200902/20090206034057.html?95754359=368302
8003 (P.R.C.).
66. [Flowchart for the Ministry of Commerce's Anti-Monopoly Review on Concen-
tration of Undertakings] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Jan. 1, 2009),
available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xgxz/200901/20090105993080.html?
733288567=3683028003.
67. [Guidelines for the Definition of the Relevant Product Market] (promulgated by
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, July 7, 2009), available at http://
news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/07/content 11668739.htm; see also Rosalind
Donald, China Issues Market Definition Guidelines, GLOBAL COMPEILTION REv., July 8
2009, available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/16520/china-
issues-market-definition-guidelines/.
68. [Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings] (promulgated by
Ministry of Commerce, November 24, 2009, effective January 1, 2010), available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/200911/20091106639149.html.
69. [Measures on Review of Concentrations of Undertakings] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Commerce, November 21, 2009, effective January 1, 2010), available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/200911/20091106639145.html.
70. Draft guidance in respect of transactions that do not meet the relevant thresholds
for notification has also been released. See [Draft Interim Measures on Investigation and
Handling of Suspected Anti-competitive Concentrations that Do Not Meet the Notifica-
tion Thresholds] (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Feb. 6, 2007), available at
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zcfb/200902/20090206031314.html?984881271=
3683028003 (P.R.C.); Draft Interim Measures on Collection of Evidence for Suspected
Anti-Competitive Concentrations that Do Not Meet the Notification Thresholds (promul-
gated by the Ministry of Commerce, Jan. 19, 2009), available at http://
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B. Comparative Design
India and Russia appear to have superior organizational design. Both
vest competition enforcement in one agency, 7 1 which permits formulation
of consistent policy, fosters more sophisticated economic analysis, and per-
mits better utilization of staff. Despite obvious differences between merger
and cartel enforcement, the underlying predicate for both is the same.
Tools such as market definition are common to the analyses of dominance
and mergers. 72 Issues too are often common, e.g., differentiation between
legitimate joint ventures and cartels. A single competition enforcement
agency also permits the development of stronger economic resources (in
comparison to smaller units attached to different agencies) and the assign-
ment of staff as needs arise. 73 During a merger downturn, for example,
additional staff can be devoted to cartel enforcement, particularly relevant
in the current economic climate.
China has multiple competition enforcement organs, but only one
merger enforcement agency. 7 4 While not optimal, it does avoid the ineffi-
ciencies seen in Brazil, where three agencies, with ill-defined roles, cur-
rently participate in the merger review.7 5 For example, all three Brazilian
agencies have the power to issue requests for additional information that
will "stop the clock."'76 Nonetheless, Brazil appears to be moving toward a
more streamlined and efficient institutional organization with the Antitrust
Bill currently before the Senate. 7 7
While we take no view here as to whether an administrator (as in Rus-
sia) or a commission (as in India) is preferable, 78 the current constitution
of CADE and the provision for two-year terms is problematic. 79 The terms
are too short, and the long absence of staggered terms exacerbated the
fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zcfb/200901/20090106010097.html?2343835767=3683
028003.
71. See D.C. SINGHA,.IA, FOREIGN COLLABORATIONS & INVESTMENTS IN INDIA: LAW AND
PROCEDURES 258, 263-65 (2d ed. 2006) (describing Indian competition laws and the
CCI); OECD, REVIEWS OF REGULATORY REFORM, RUSSIA: BUILDING RULES FOR THE MARKET
116-17 (2005) (describing broadly FAS).
72. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 65 (6th ed.
2007)) ("The standards for determining the scope of the relevant product and geo-
graphic markets under Section 1 [prohibiting anticompetitive agreements] are the same
as those used under Section 2 [prohibiting creation and maintenance of a monopoly] of
the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act [regulating mergers and
acquisitions]").
73. See Francisco de Magalhies & Nogueira Dias, supra note 30, at 34 (discussing
efficiencies in the Brazilian context).
74. See supra note 20.
75. See Francisco de Magalhtes & Nogueira Dias, supra note 30, at 33 (enumerating
Brazil's three antitrust enforcement agencies).
76. See BAL art. 54(8); see also OECD BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 57.
77. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text; see also Knox, supra note 30.
78. The senior author, having served on two collegiate bodies, admits some sympa-
thy for the administrator model.
79. See John W. Clark, Competition Policy and Regulatory Reform in Brazil: A Progress
Report, OECD J. COMPEnTION L. & PoL'Y, Oct. 2000, at 182, 214-15; see also OECD,
POLICY BRIEF: COMPETITION LAw & POLICY IN BRAZIL 4 (2005), available at http://
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/35/35415135.pdf.
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problem by injecting too much inexperience at one time.8 0 It has also been
suggested that the term length encourages Commissioners to curry favor
with politicians in an effort to secure reappointment. 8 1 Obviously the pro-
posed amendments, if enacted, will help, but it is debatable whether the
proposed four-year term is sufficient.
8 2
II. Jurisdiction Generally
Each of the BRIC jurisdictions has a mandatory pre-merger notifica-
tion regime;8 3 Russia also has a mandatory post-merger notification
regime.8 4 Of the four jurisdictions, only Brazil does not have a suspensory
regime at the present time.85
The BRIC jurisdictions have taken different approaches to the defini-
tion of a concentration; whereas Brazil and India provide a broad defini-
tion,8 6 China and Russia identify those transactions that constitute a
concentration.8 7 Corresponding to their respective approaches in relation
to the definition of concentration, Brazil and India also define "control"
broadly;8 8 China, in contrast, provides no definition of control. 89 Russia
does not define "control" as such, but instead provides examples of various
forms of control via the definition of a "group." 90
Each of the BRIC jurisdictions imposes a turnover jurisdictional test;9 1
80. See OECD BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 48. For a period of many years, for
several reasons, including delays in individual appointments and resignations, the
appointment of three Commissioners and the CADE President coincided. Because the
confirmation of the current President was delayed by a number of months, his term is
now separated from that of the three Commissioners (who were appointed at the same
time, but confirmed months earlier). In the future (if the law does not change), the
appointments of the President and two groups each of three Commissioners will be
staggered.
81. See id.
82. See POLICY BRIEF: COMPETITION LAW & POLICY IN BRAZIL, supra note 79, at 4 (sug-
gesting that four-year terms may be insufficient to ensure agency autonomy because the
Brazilian President, who appoints the commissioners, also serves a four-year term).
83. BAL art. 54; LPC arts. 27(1), 28(1), 29(1); CAA § 6(2); AML art. 21.
84. See LPC art. 30.
85. See BAL (not prohibiting the parties from closing a transaction for a definitive
period of time in order to allow the competition agencies to complete their review). The
Antitrust Bill, however, introduces a suspensory regime in Brazil. See Antitrust Bill arts.
88(3)-(4); see also supra note 30.
86. See CAA § 2(a); BAL art. 54(3). The Antitrust Bill identifies those acts that con-
stitute a concentration. Antitrust Bill art. 90; see also infra note 100 and accompanying
text.
87. See AML art. 20; LPC arts. 27-29.
88. See Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica, Resoluoao No. 15, de 19 de
agosto de 1998, D.O.U. 28.8.98 (Braz.) [hereinafter CADE Resolution No. 15] (defining
"control"); CAA §5(a).
89. See AML (lacking a definition of control); see also infra notes 159-161 and
accompanying text.
90. See LPC art. 9.
91. BAL art. 54(3); LPC arts. 27(1), 28(1), 29(1), 30(1); CAA §5; Rules on Notifica-
tion Thresholds, supra note 62, art. 3; see also infra notes 102, 105 and accompanying
text (discussing Brazil); infra notes 137, 141-142, 145-146 and accompanying text (dis-
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India and Russia also incorporate an asset test.9 2 Moreover, both Russia
and Brazil also apply a market share test.9 3
1. Brazil. Although Brazil currently has a non-suspensory regime, 9 4
CADE has made use of preliminary injunctions in complex and potentially
anticompetitive transactions to prevent the parties from closing the transac-
tion before completion of the review process and thus preserve the efficacy
of CADE's final decision. 95 The injunction may be issued ex officio, or at
the request of SEAE, SDE, or an interested third party. 96 CADE also may
enter into an agreement with the parties, known as an APRO,9 7 preventing
the implementation of the transaction until completion of the merger
review process. 9 8
Concentration is defined broadly to cover any act that may limit or
otherwise restrain open competition or that results in the control of rele-
vant markets for certain products or services. 9 9 The BAL clarifies that this
includes actions intended for any form of economic concentration,
whether through a merger, an acquisition of sole or joint control over an
undertaking, or an acquisition of shares or votes. 10 0
While the BAL does not provide a definition of control, CADE's Reso-
lutions define control broadly, as the power to direct the activities of an
undertaking and its business policy. 1 1
cussing Russia); infra notes 149-156 and accompanying text (discussing India); infra
note 162 and accompanying text (discussing China).
92. CAA § 5; LPC arts. 27(1), 28(1), 29(1), 30(1); see also infra notes 149-156 and
accompanying text (discussing India); infra notes 136-137, 139-142, 145-146 and
accompanying text (discussing Russia).
93. See LPC arts. 27(1), 28(1); see also BAL art. 54(3). The Antitrust Bill provides for
a turnover test only. See Antitrust Bill art. 88; see also infra notes 138, 143 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Russia); infra notes 102, 111 and accompanying text (discussing
Brazil).
94. See supra note 85.
95. CADE Resolution 28/02 formalized CADE's power to issue injunctions (prior to
this resolution, CADE had issued such injunctions, e.g., in the AmBev and WorldCom/
Sprint cases). See Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica, Resolulho No. 28, de
24 de julho de 2002, D.O.U. de 2.8.2002, republicada em 9.8.2002 [hereinafter CADE
Resolution No. 28/02], available at http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?ef3OfO3fcd4c
cc6dfa5c (Braz.). CADE Resolution 45/07 later replaced CADE Resolution 28/02. See
Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica, ResoluAo No. 45, de 28 de marco de
2007 [hereinafter CADE Resolution No. 45/07], available at http://www.cade.gov.br/
Default.aspx?ef30f03 fcd4ccc6dfa5c (Braz.).
96. See ICN, MERGER NOTIFICATION AND PROCEDURES TEMPLATE: BRAZIL 10 (2005)
[hereinafter BRAZIL MERGER NOTIFICATION AND PROCEDURES TEMPLATE], available at http://
www.cade.gov.br/Internacional/ICNMerger-Template-2005.pdf.
97. Acordos de Preservaqio de Reversibilidade da Operaqho, or a Transaction
Reversibility Preservation Agreement.
98. See CADE Resolution No. 28/02, supra note 95, ch. 2, later replaced by CADE
Resolution No. 45/07, supra note 95; see also infra note 316.
99. BAL art. 54(3).
100. BAL art. 54(3). The Antitrust Bill identifies those acts that constitute a concen-
tration as: the consummation of an amalgamation of two or more previously indepen-
dent companies; the acquisition of control of, or portions of, one or more companies;
merger; or the execution of a joint venture or consortium agreement. Antitrust Bill art.
90.
101. See CADE Resolution No. 15, supra note 88.
Vol. 43
2010 BRIC in the International Merger Review Edifice
Brazil currently applies both a turnover and a market share jurisdic-
tional test, 10 2 but the Antitrust Bill provides for a turnover test only. 10 3
The transaction is notifiable if one of the parties to the transaction has a
turnover of BRL 400 million (approx. USD 200 million10 4 ). 10 5 The BAL
does not explicitly state whether the turnover test applies to the parties'
worldwide sales or only to their Brazilian sales. 10 6 Previously the test was
applied to the former; however, in January 2005, CADE issued a deci-
sion, 10 7 followed by its Suimula No. 1 issued on October 18, 2005, clarify-
ing that the test would henceforth apply only to turnover in, into, and from
Brazil.' 0 8 This has significantly reduced the number of transactions
requiring notification in Brazil. 10 9 Nonetheless, when calculating the turn-
over of the parties, the turnover of the entire group (including any under-
takings under common control) must be taken into account. 10 Although
such a requirement is arguably justifiable in respect of the purchaser's
group, in the case of the seller, only the turnover of the target should be
considered. Taking the turnover of additional seller group companies acts
merely to increase the number of filings without enabling the agency to
identify additional potentially harmful transactions.
Alternatively, a filing will be triggered on the basis of a market share of
20% or more in any relevant market, which must include, at least in part,
the Brazilian market." ' This test was initially applied to the market share
of the target only; i.e., a filing was triggered if the target alone reached the
20% market share threshold, even if the acquirer was not active in that
102. BAL art. 54(3).
103. Antitrust Bill art. 88.
104. All currency conversions are based on the OECD average exchange rates for
2009, available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (expand "Finance" theme; then fol-
low "Financial Indicators (MEI)" hyperlinks to "Exchange Rates (USD monthly
averages)").
105. The Antitrust Bill includes a proposal to modify the notification thresholds to
impose a turnover threshold on both parties and is therefore expected to reduce the
number of filings. Article 88 requires that one party's group has turnover of at least BRL
400 million (approx. USD 200 million) and another party's group has turnover of at
least BRL 30 million in Brazil (approx. USD 15 million) in order to trigger a merger
notification requirement. Compare BAL art. 54(3) with Antitrust Bill art. 88.
106. See BAL art. 54(3).
107. ADC Telecommunications Inc./Krone International Holding Inc., CADE, Case
No. 08012.002992/02004-14, Relator: Roberto Augusto Catellanos Pfeiffer, Jan. 19,
2005 (Brazil).
108. SImula No. 1, D.O. de 18.10.2005 (Brazil), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/
Default.aspx?1629f90fe63cd052a491a3b48c. The Antitrust Bill includes a nexus
requirement; under the proposed legislation, the turnover of each party must be in Bra-
zil in order to trigger a merger filing notification. Antitrust Bill art. 88.
109. Mauro Grinberg & Camilla Paoletti, Brazil: Merger Control, in GLOBAL COMPETI-
TION REv., ANTITRUST REVIEW OF THE AMERIcAs 2010 (2010), available at http://
www.globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/20/sections/76/chapters/800/brazil-
merger-control.
110. GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., GETING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010
(2010).
111. BAL art. 54.
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market. 112 In its October 1, 2008 decision, Cintinori Acquisition GmbH/
Jost Holding GmbH,113 CADE effectively reduced the scope of the market
share test by ruling that where there is neither a horizontal overlap nor a
vertical relationship between the parties, a filing will not be triggered. 114
At least until (and if) the Antitrust Bill comes into force, it remains to be
seen whether CADE will follow its precedent on this issue, although it
seems likely. There are no guidelines for calculating market shares."l 5
2. Russia. The Russian legislation sets out a comprehensive list of
the events that constitute a merger, including the:
1) Acquisition of (indirect or direct) rights that make it possible for
the acquirer to determine the commercial behavior of the target;' 16
2) Acquisition of shares resulting in the acquirer holding a stake of
over 25%, 117 50%,118 or 75%119 in a joint-stock company, or
over 33.33%,120 50%,121 or 66.67%122 in a limited liability
company; 123
3) Incorporation of a company by contribution of assets or shares in
another company; 124
4) Merger of one company with another or the consolidation of sev-
eral companies; and 125
5) Acquisition of over 20% (by book value) of an entity's fixed pro-
duction assets (other than land, non-industrial buildings and
premises (or parts thereof) and unfinished construction sites) and/
or intangible assets. 126
Unlike the previous merger control laws, 127 the LPC does not provide
112. Cristianne S. Zarzur, Lilian Barreira & Marcos P. Garrido, Pinheiro Neto Advo-
gados, CADE Decision Signals New Interpretation of Criterion for Notification of Concen-
tration Acts, ATTACHMENT: BIBLIOTECA INFORMA NEWSLETTER No. 2030, Oct. 12-18, 2008,
at 2, available at http://www.pinheironeto.com.br/upload/tb_pinheironeto artigo/pdf/
231008155853MicrosoftWord anexobi2030_i.pdf.
113. CADE, No. 08012.007026/2008-17, Relator: Paulo Furquim de Azevedo,
11.10.2008 (Brazil). See also Zarzur, Barreira & Garrido, supra note 112, at 2 ("[Alt its
430th Ordinary Judgment Session held on October 1, 2008, in a decision rendered in
connection with Concentration Act No, 08012.007026/2008-17, CADE adopted, by
unanimous vote, the stand that there must be a causal relation between the notified
transaction and actual verification of the 20% market share ....").
114. See Zarzur, Barreira & Garrido, supra note 112, at 2-3.
115. BRAZIL MERGER NOTIFICATION AND PROCEDURES TEMPLATE, supra note 96, at 6.
116. LPC arts. 28(1)(8), 29(1)(8).
117. Id. arts. 28(l)(1), 29(1)(1).
118. Id. arts. 28(l)(4), 29(1)(4).
119. Id. arts. 28(1)(6), 29(1)(6).
120. Id. arts. 28(1)(2), 29(1)(2).
121. Id. arts. 28(1)(3), 29(1)(3).
122. Id. arts. 28(1)(5), 29(1)(5).
123. These thresholds require a filing if the acquirer crosses the relevant threshold;
e.g., an acquirer that holds 26% and purchases additional stock, taking it over the 50%
threshold, must submit a merger filing notification.
124. LPC arts. 27(1)(4)-(5).
125. Id. arts. 27(1)(1)-(3).
126. Id. art. 28(1)(7).
127. See supra note 39.
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a definition of control. 128 However, through the definition of a "group",
the LPC determines that control includes the following situations: (1) hold-
ing more than 50% of the voting shares in a company; 129 (2) having the
right to determine the business activities of another company, either (a)
contractually, 130 or (b) through the right to appoint the general director' 3 '
or more than 50% of the members of the executive or supervisory body;
13 2
and (3) having the right to give binding instructions to another company
on the basis either of corporate documents or a contractual arrange-
ment.133 The need for a filing on the basis of so-called "negative control"
(i.e., the ability to veto certain actions by the company) therefore cannot be
excluded. Several jurisdictions, including the European Union (E.U.),
require merger notification on the acquisition of negative control 134 and
therefore such a requirement cannot be said to be against international
practice. However, provision for a filing in such circumstances generally
creates uncertainty for the parties, necessitating difficult judgment calls to
be made as to whether a filing is required.
Russia applies three alternative jurisdictional tests for a pre-merger fil-
ing:135 the first applies to the assets of the acquirer's group and target's
group, 136 the second applies to the turnover and assets of the acquirer's
group and target's group, 137 and the third applies to the market share of
any entity within either the acquirer's group or the target's group. 138 Thus,
the transaction will be notifiable if:
1) The worldwide book value of the assets of the:
a. Acquirer's group and the target's group when aggregated
exceeds RUB 7 billion (approx. USD 221 million); 13 9 and
128. LPC arts. 27-30 (failing to provide a definition of control).
129. Id. arts. 9(1)-(2), (15).
130. Id. arts. 9(5)-(6).
131. Id. arts. 9(7)-(8).
132. Id. arts. 9(9)-(10).
133. Id. arts. 9(5)-(6).
134. Commission Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice under Council Regulation (EC)
No. 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, para. 54, 2008
O.J. (C 95) 01, 16, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri =
OJ:C:2008:095:0001:0048:EN:PDF.
135. For transactions in which "financial organizations" are targets, separate asset
value thresholds were established on May 30, 2007 by the Russian government. Govern-
ment Resolutions 334 and 335, dated May 30, 2007, as amended. Under the LPC,
"financial organizations" include banks, insurance companies, and securities manage-
ment companies, etc. LPC art. 4(6). Changes proposed by FAS were recently imple-
mented, enabling smaller banks to combine: banks with assets of no more than RUR 24
billion (approx. USD 756 million) (increased from RUR 14 billion (approx. USD 441
million)) can now acquire banks with assets of up to RUR 6 billion (approx. USD 189
million) (increased from RUR 4 billion (approx. USD 126 million)) without the need to
submit a merger notification filing. See Russian Federation Government Resolution on
Amendment of Government Ruling No. 335 of May 30, 2007, No. 591 of July 17, 2009.
136. See infra notes 139-140.
137. See infra notes 141-142.
138. See infra note 143.
139. LPC art. 28(1).
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b. Target's group alone exceeds RUB 250 million (approx. USD 8
million); 140 or
2) Worldwide, the:
a. Aggregate turnover in the last financial year of the acquirer's
group and the target's group exceeds RUB 10 billion (approx.
USD 315 million); and 141
b. Book value of the assets of the target's group alone exceeds RUB
250 million (approx. USD 8 million);142 or
3) One of the companies of the acquirer's group or the target's group
is listed in the Register as either a dominant company or a com-
pany with a market share exceeding 35% on a relevant Russian
commodities market. 143
A post-merger filing may be required if the pre-merger filing thresh-
olds were not met.144 The jurisdictional thresholds for a post-merger filing
are:
1) The worldwide asset book value or turnover in the last financial
year of the acquirer's group and the target's group when aggregated
exceeds RUB 400 million (approx. USD 13 million);145 and
2) The book value of the assets of the target's group alone exceeds
RUB 60 million (approx. USD 2 million). 146
The post-merger notification test is thus similar to the pre-merger test,
but the thresholds are set at a much lower level, giving FAS the opportunity
to review smaller, less economically significant mergers without impacting
the transaction, unless of course substantive issues arise.
3. India. The CAA applies to any "combination," which includes
those transactions that involve the acquisition of shares, voting rights,
assets, or "control."'14 7 Control is defined neither in the CAA nor in the
draft Merger Regulations, but is stated to include control of the affairs or
management of an enterprise or group either jointly or singly. 14 8
India applies two alternative thresholds, the first of which applies to
the joint assets and turnover of the parties, 14 9 and the second of which
applies to the assets and turnover of the acquirer's group only. 150 The
transaction will be notifiable if:
1) The parties jointly have either:
a. Assets in India of INR 10 billion (approx. USD 207 million) or
more or turnover in India of INR 30 billion (approx. USD 620
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. arts. 27(1)(1), 28(1)(1).
144. Id. art. 30(2).
145. Id. arts. 30(1), (2).
146. Id. arts. 30(1), (2), (5).
147. CAA § 2(a).
148. Id. § 5.
149. See infra notes 151-153.
150. See infra notes 154-156.
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million) or more;15 1 or
b. Worldwide assets of USD 500 million or more and assets in
India of INR 5 billion (approx. USD 103 million) or more;15 2 or
c. Worldwide turnover of USD 1.5 billion or more and turnover in
India of INR 15 billion (approx. USD 310 million) or more; 153
or
2) The acquirer's group has:
a. Assets in India of INR 40 billion (approx. USD 826 million) or
more, or turnover in India of INR 120 billion (approx. USD 2.5
billion) or more; 15 4 or
b. Worldwide assets of USD 2 billion or more and assets in India
of INR 5 billion (approx. USD 103 million) or more;155 or
c. Worldwide turnover of USD 6 billion or more and turnover in
India of INR 15 billion (approx. USD 310 million) 156 or more.
This test has been criticized as potentially requiring a filing even
though the target has no Indian nexus, because the test is based on either
the parties' combined activities or the acquirer's activities alone. 15 7
4. China. The AML defines a "concentration" as: a merger of under-
takings; an acquisition by an undertaking of control over one or more
undertakings by acquiring equity interests or assets; or an acquisition by
an undertaking of control or the ability to exert a decisive influence over
one or more undertakings by contract or other means. 158
The AML does not define the level of shareholding or influence that
confers control or "decisive influence." 15 9 The draft Interim Measures on
Notification of Concentrations defined the "acquisition of control of other
undertakings,"'160 but this definition was dropped from the final ver-
sion. 16 1 The level of influence that will trigger a notification filing there-
fore remains unclear.
151. CAA § 5(a)(i)(A).
152. Id. § 5(a)(i)(B).
153. Id.
154. Id. § 5(a)(ii)(A).
155. Id. § 5(a)(ii)(B).
156. Id.
157. Shantanu Mukherjee, Indian Competition Law and the Challenge of Merger Con-
trol, AsIALAw, Aug. 2009, available at http://www.asialaw.com/Article/2267785/
Channel/ 16707/Indian-competition-law-and-the-challengeof-merger-control.html.
158. AML art. 20.
159. Id.
160. Draft Interim Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings,
art. 3, available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/zcfb/200901/20090106011461.
html?2511673463=3683028003 (defining control as the acquisition of over 50% of the
voting rights or assets of another undertaking; or in the absence of acquisition of over
50% of the voting rights or assets of another undertaking, obtaining the ability to decide
the appointment of one or more board members and key management members, budg-
ets, operations and sales, pricing, substantial investment or other important manage-
ment and operational strategies, through acquisition of shares and assets or through
contract(s) or other means).
161. Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings, supra note 68,
art. 3.
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China applies a turnover jurisdictional test. A transaction will require
notification if it satisfies either of the following tests:
1) The parties have a combined worldwide turnover in excess of RMB
10 billion (approx. USD 1.5 billion) and the turnover of each of at
least two parties in China exceeds RMB 400 million (approx. USD
59 million); or
2) The parties have a combined turnover in China in excess of RMB 2
billion (approx. USD 293 million) and the turnover of each of at
least two parties in China exceeds RMB 400 million (approx. USD
59 million). 162
Moreover, it is open to the parties to voluntarily notify a transaction,
even if it fails to meet the thresholds outlined above. 163
When calculating a party's turnover, the turnover of all entities that it
controls, or that are controlled by it, must be included; the requisite control
may be either direct or indirect. 164 Nonetheless, in an asset acquisition,
only the turnover generated by those assets to be acquired needs to be
taken into account when assessing the target's turnover. 165
As is generally the case, onshore sales from Chinese subsidiaries and
export sales into China must be included when calculating turnover in
order to determine whether a transaction is notifiable or not.16 6
It merits mention that China does not require notification in two-party
transactions unless there is a nexus between the parties and the jurisdic-
tion. 167 Each of the alternative turnover tests requires that each of at least
two parties has turnover in excess of approximately USD 59 million in
China.168 In the case of three-party (or more) transactions, however, a fil-
ing may be required on the basis that each of the acquirers meets the
threshold, even though the target has little or no presence in China.169
162. Rules on Notification Thresholds, supra note 62, art. 3.
163. Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings, supra note 68,
art. 16.
164. AML art. 20; see also Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertak-
ings, supra note 68, art. 3.
165. Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings, supra note 68,
art. 7.
166. Although the initial draft Interim Measures on Notification of Concentrations of
Undertakings specifically excluded turnover from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, the
final version is silent on this point. See Measures on Notification of Concentrations of
Undertakings, supra note 68, art. 4; see also supra note 160.
167. SeeJonathan Galloway, Convergence in International Merger Controls, 5 COMPET-
TION L.REv. 179, 183-184 (2009) (discussing China's local nexus requirement).
168. Rules on Notification Thresholds, supra note 62, art. 3; see also supra note 162
and accompanying text.
169. The turnover thresholds require that each of at least two parties has a turnover
in excess of 400 million RMB (approx. USD 59 million). Rules on Notification Thresh-
olds, supra note 62, art. 3. In a transaction involving three or more parties, this require-
ment could potentially be satisfied by the two buyers, and thus the target need not
necessarily have a significant presence in China.
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A. Comparative Jurisdictional Issues
Market share jurisdictional tests pose problems. First, it can be diffi-
cult to determine with certainty whether a notification is required because
there is frequently little or no guidance on market definition at an early
stage of a transaction. 170 Second, even where market definition analysis
could be done, it can be costly and time consuming, even where the trans-
action obviously presents no substantive issue. It should be noted that the
market share test as applied in Russia avoids the former criticism, because
it imposes an objective test; a notification is triggered on the basis of
whether a party is registered with the requisite market share. 1 71 The move
to abolish the Brazilian market share test in the Antitrust Bill is welcomed,
although it remains to be seen whether the Antitrust Bill will pass into
law. 172
There is a consensus within the international competition community
that transactions ought not to be reviewed unless there is a nexus between
the reviewing jurisdiction and the transaction. 173 Yet of the BRIC jurisdic-
tions, only China includes such a test.1 74 Fortunately, it appears that the
enforcement agencies in Brazil 17 5 and India 176 appreciate the wisdom of a
170. See ICN, RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES 3-4
(2002) [hereinafter RECOMMENDED PRACTICES], available at http://www.international
competitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc588.pdf (adopted by the ICN membership
at its inaugural conference in September 2002).
171. LPC arts. 27(1)(1), 28(1)(1); see also supra note 143 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 30.
173. RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, supra note 170, at 1.
174. See Galloway, supra note 167, at 183 -84 (describing China's local nexus require-
ment); see also supra notes 167-169.
175. See BAL art. 54. Mergers between foreign companies that are not situated in
Brazil must be notified only if they have or could have "effects" in Brazil. Id. art. 2.
"Effects" are defined broadly for the purposes of the merger legislation and, in practice,
if the parties have sales in or into Brazil or assets in Brazil, a notification must be filed.
Moreover, a filing can be triggered on the basis of the seller's turnover alone. However,
in 2005, CADE clarified that the turnover test would apply henceforth only to turnover
into or from Brazil. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Moreover, there appears
to be a new trend to dismiss notifications of foreign-to-foreign transactions that: (1) have
no impact, or insignificant impact, in Brazil; or (2) involve a target with de minimis turn-
over in Brazil (there has as yet been no indication of the level of sales below which a
filing will not be required). SEAE and SDE have argued in cases since 2006 and 2007
that jurisdiction should be refused on the basis that the target's connection with Brazil is
de minimis, but to date, CADE has not dismissed such cases; rather, it has gone on to
review those cases. As discussed above, the Antitrust Bill introduces a requirement that
two parties must have turnover in excess of the relevant thresholds in Brazil, thus effec-
tively introducing a nexus test, except in the case of a transaction involving more than
two parties. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
176. See joint Comments of the American Bar Association's Sections of Antitrust, Bus-
iness, and International Law, Implementing Regulations for and Amendments to the
Merger Control Provisions of India's Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007 A.B.A. SECS. OF
ANTITR ST LAw, Bus. LAw, AND INT'L LAW at 5 [hereinafter ABA Joint Comments]
(explaining that India's statutory notification requirements seem inconsistent with the
ICN's Recommended Practices recommending asserting jurisdiction only over those
transactions that have an appropriate nexus with the jurisdiction concerned); see also
Galloway, supra note 167, at 184. In India, the CCI has jurisdiction if the relevant com-
bination "causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the
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nexus requirement. Each of these two regulators has recognized and devel-
oped a different means of introducing the principle that parties to a trans-
action with no effect on a jurisdiction should not be required to notify that
transaction in that jurisdiction. 17 7 Nonetheless, in Russia, although a
transaction is notifiable under the LPC only if it may influence competition
in the Russian market, in practice, if the transaction involves shares or
rights in a Russian company or the direct acquisition of Russian assets, a
notification is required. 178
Suspensory regimes, ceteris paribus, are to be preferred. This qualifi-
cation is important because prohibition of closing pending review imposes
costs on the parties. Abuse of this power may result in the abandonment of
transactions posing no competitive threat. Assuming no abuse, suspensory
merger review ensures that adequate remedies are preserved. The United
States' (U.S.) experience prior to its pre-merger notification program well
illustrates these problems. 179 Although Brazil does not currently have a
suspensory regime, the Antitrust Bill, if passed, would introduce such a
regime.18 0 In the event that the Antitrust Bill fails to pass, CADE's power to
obtain an injunction blocking the transaction pending review may con-
tinue to ameliorate this problem.18 1
relevant market in India." CAA § 6. The CAA provides a non-exhaustive list of factors
to which the CCI must have "due regard" when considering whether a combination
causes an "appreciable adverse effect." Id. § 20(4). Perhaps in reaction to criticism of
the lack of a requirement that the target have a nexus with India, the draft Merger Regu-
lations address this concern by stating that those combinations where each of at least
two parties (e.g., the acquirer and target) does not meet either a turnover or asset thresh-
old in India are not "likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect" on competition. Com-
petition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft of (Combination) Regulations (200),
regs. 5(1), (2)(iv). The CCI has issued a press release stating that transactions that do
not meet these thresholds are not notifiable. See Gireesh Chandra Prasad, Competition
Commission Ready to Address Industry's Concerns Over 9 Issues, THE ECONOMIC TIMES,
April 10, 2008, available at http://www.cci.gov.in/index.php?option=com.news&sid=
4&task=details. Thus, it is likely that, in practice, a combination will be notifiable only
where the target meets either the asset or turnover threshold in India.
177. See supra notes 175-176.
178. See Tapani Manninen, et al., Russian Competition Law: Overview and Recent
Developments, in GLOBAL COMPETITION REv., EUROPEAN ANiTRUST REv. 2009 (2009) (dis-
cussing the inconsistencies in FAS' approach to the merger notification requirements).
In Russia, a foreign-to-foreign transaction falls within the scope of the LPC only if it:
(1)(i) involves the acquisition of shares in, or rights to determine the commercial activity
of, a Russian company, or (ii) involves the direct acquisition of assets (fixed production
or intangible) located in Russia; and (2) may influence competition in the Russian mar-
ket. LPC art. 3(2). In practice, however, a filing is required if the criteria in (1) above,
together with the jurisdictional thresholds, are satisfied, because FAS takes the position
that only it is empowered to decide whether the transaction may or may not influence
competition. FAS now applies a broader concept of effect on the Russian market, which
includes consideration of market shares and presence.
179. See Kenneth G. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J. L. & ECON.
43, 50-52 (1969).
180. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also supra note 30.
181. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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III. Specific Jurisdictional Issues
A. Minority Interests
Of the BRIC jurisdictions, it appears that only Russia and India
require a merger notification in the case of a minority acquisition that does
not result in some change in control over the target. 18 2
1. Brazil. An acquisition of a minority interest must be notified
where it may cause a change in the target's management policy or in the
internal dynamics of corporate control. 18 3 In its 2006 decision in OHL/
Vianorte, CADE recognized that the acquisition of a minority shareholding
will be notifiable only if the buyer acquires "relevant influence" over the
target.184 In assessing whether relevant influence is being acquired, CADE
routinely considers rights to appoint board members, access to strategic
information and decisions and veto rights beyond mere protection of
minority shareholders' economic interests. 185
CADE subsequently issued Stimula No. 2, confirming that an increase
in shareholding by a majority shareholder will not be notifiable unless
there is some change in control or a change in the competitive environ-
ment.18 6 Therefore, notification will not be required unless: (1) the seller
has statutory or contractual powers to appoint management, to influence
the target's commercial policy, or to exercise veto rights; (2) the transaction
imposes a non-compete valid for over five years or with a geographic scope
broader than the target's area of activity; or (3) a clause provides for control
among the parties. 18 7
2. Russia. The acquisition of a minority interest falls within the
scope of the LPC.1 88 A direct acquisition of shares resulting in the acquirer
holding an interest of over 25% in a joint stock company, or over 33.33% in
a limited liability company, is potentially notifiable. 18 9 Where a minority
interest in a Russian company is acquired indirectly, even if it is below the'
182. See LPC arts. 28-29; CAA § 5 (requiring notification where control, shares, vot-
ing rights or assets are acquired); Competition Commission of India [CCI], Proposed
Draft (Combination) Regulations (200.), regs. 5(1), 5(2)(i); see also infra notes 183-185
and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); infra notes 188-190 and accompanying text
(discussing Russia); infra notes 191-192 and accompanying text (discussing India);
infra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing China).
183. See BAL art. 54 (outlining which acts should be submitted to CADE for review);
see also GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 66. The
Antitrust Bill clarifies that an acquisition of a minority interest that does not have direct
or indirect decision-making power or the capacity to influence the competitive behavior
of the target is not a concentration for the purpose of merger review notification. OECD,
POLICY ROUNDTABLES: MINORITY SHAREHOLDINGS 189 (2008), DAF/COMP (Dec. 2, 2008)
[hereinafter OECD, POLICY ROUNDTABLES], available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
40/38/41774055.pdf.
184. No. 0812.006124/2006-75, Realtor: Conselheiro Luis Fernando Schuartz,
4.10.2006 (Brazil).
185. OECD, POLICY ROUNDTABLES, supra note 183, at 190.
186. Sfimula No. 2, de 22 de agosto de 2007, D.O. de 27.08.2007 (Brazil), available at
http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?91a475849d73898a9ca9bb8ca7.
187. Id.
188. LPC arts. 28-29; see also supra notes 117, 120 and accompanying text.
189. LPC arts. 28(1)(1)-(2), 29(1)(1)-(2).
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25% or 33.33% threshold, the filing requirement will be triggered if the
interest gives the acquirer certain material rights (e.g., under a shareholder
agreement) with respect to the Russian company. 190
3. India. The draft Merger Regulations in the context of the substan-
tive review create a number of safe harbors for acquisitions that are not
"likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition," including
the acquisition of shares not exceeding a 15% stake in the target that does
not confer control and is solely for the purpose of investment or in the
ordinary course of business. 1 9 1 Although the draft Merger Regulations are
silent on the point, it has been suggested that the CCI may, in practice,
treat transactions falling within these safe harbors as non-notifiable. 19 2
4. China. As a general rule, it is expected that the acquisition of a
minority interest will not trigger a notification requirement unless control
is acquired. 193
B. Joint Ventures
Some jurisdictions distinguish between "concentrative" (i.e., corpo-
rate) joint ventures (JVs) and "cooperative" JVs. 194 A further distinction
can be made between "full-function" and "non-full-function" JVs. 19 None
of the BRIC jurisdictions utilizes these distinctions.
None of the BRIC jurisdictions has special rules for the formation of a
JV; if the thresholds/jurisdictional tests are met, the formation of a JV will
be notifiable, whether concentrative or cooperative, full-function or not.196
190. Id. arts. 28(1)(8), 29(1)(8).
191. See Competition Commission of India [CCI], Proposed Draft of (Combination)
Regulations (200), regs. 5(1), 5(2)(i). A similar safe harbor applies to: an acquisition of
assets not directly related to the acquirer's business or made solely as an investment or
in the ordinary course of business that does not result in the acquisition of control over
the target, except where the acquired assets represent the target's entire business opera-
tions in a particular location or for a particular product. See id. reg. 5(2)(ii).
192. See ABAJoint Comments, supra note 176, at 7; ABA, PERSPECTIVES ON THE RECENT
AMENDMENTS TO INDIA'S COMPETITION ACT 2002 (2002), available at http://www.abanet.
org/antitrust/at-committees/at-ic/programs.shtml.
193. Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings, supra note 68,
art. 3
194. See Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Reg-
ulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings (EU), 2004 OJ. (C 31)
3, para. 85, in which the E.U. refers to concentrative joint ventures.
195. See Commission Notice on the Concept of Full-Function joint Ventures under
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings COM (1998) final (Mar. 2, 1998).
196. See BAL art. 54 (outlining which acts should be submitted to CADE for review
and lacking specific rules for formation of a joint venture); LPC arts. 27-30 (outlining
notification requirements and lacking specific rules for formation of a joint venture);
CAA §§ 5, 6 (outlining notification requirements and lacking specific rules for forma-
tion of a joint venture). In China, the draft Interim Measures on Notification of Concen-
trations at article 3 provided that "two or more undertakings jointly establishing a new
enterprise" constitutes a concentration. See supra note 160. This provision was omitted
from the final version of the Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertak-
ings. See supra note 68.
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C. Intra-Person Exemption
There appears to be a growing consensus in the BRIC jurisdictions
that a filing should not be required in the case of intra-person transactions.
In Brazil, India, and China such transactions are exempt from notifica-
tion. 197 In Russia, although a pre-merger filing is technically required, it is
possible to obtain an exemption and to file instead a post-merger
notification. 19 8
1. Brazil. Intra-person transactions are exempt. 199 Thus, a simple
corporate restructuring need not be notified.20 0
2. Russia. Intra-person transfers are technically subject to
mandatory pre-notification; however, the LPC Amendment introduced an
exemption from this requirement. 20 1 Transfers within a group, the struc-
ture of which is transparent and based on holding more than 50% of the
voting shares, are subject only to post-merger notification. 20 2 In order to
obtain this exemption, a member of the group must submit to FAS one
month before consummation a list of its group members, stating the reason
that each entity is included within the group.20 3 Within fourteen days of
receipt, FAS will inform the parties whether the list has been accepted.20 4
3. India. Although there is no exemption for intra-person transac-
tions under the CAA, the draft Merger Regulations provide a safe harbor,
carving out as not "likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on compe-
tition" share acquisitions where the acquirer holds a 50% shareholding
prior to the acquisition. 20 5 There has been some indication that, in prac-
tice, the CCI will treat such transactions as non-notifiable. 20 6
4. China. A prior notification is not required for intra-person trans-
actions; under the AML, no filing is required if one entity (whether or not
itself involved in the transaction) holds more than 50% of the voting shares
or assets of each undertaking involved in the transaction. 20 7
D. "Knock on the Door": Jurisdiction over Non-Reportable Transactions
Only in Brazil and India may the relevant competition agency be
denied jurisdiction to investigate a transaction that raises substantive com-
197. See infra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); infra notes
205-206 and accompanying text (discussing India); infra note 207 and accompanying
text (discussing China).
198. LPC art. 31.
199. See BRAZIL MERGER NOTIFICATION AND PROCEDURES TEMPLATE, supra note 96, at 3.
200. See id.
201. See LPC art. 31.
202. Id. arts. 9, 31(1).
203. Id. art. 31(1).
204. Id. art. 31(2).
205. Competition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft of (Combination) Regula-
tions (200), regs. 5(1), (2)(iv).
206. See ABA, PERSPECTIVES ON THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO INDIA'S COMPETITION ACT
2002, supra note 192.
207. See AML art. 22.
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petition concerns but does not meet the applicable threshold(s). 20 8
Although such a limitation provides certainty to parties, it also acts to
undermine the policy underlying the merger notification regime: preven-
tion of anticompetitive conduct.20 9
IV. Timing
A. Filing Deadlines
Generally, suspensory regimes do not have filing deadlines; because
the parties cannot consummate the transaction until either it has been
cleared or the relevant waiting period has expired, imposition of a filing
deadline is unnecessary. 210 Consistent with this principle, Brazil imposes
a deadline, whereas China and Russia (in respect of the pre-merger filing
obligation) do not.2 1 1 India is an anomaly. 2 12
1. Brazil. Notifiable transactions must be notified within fifteen bus-
iness days of the "realization" of the transaction.2 13 CADE issued a resolu-
tion to clarify the time at which a transaction is "realized" as the execution
of a binding document or agreement. 214 In the past, CADE treated almost
208. In Brazil, although there is no express provision giving the agencies jurisdiction
over non-reportable transactions, CADE could potentially pursue such a transaction as
an anticompetitive act. See BAL art. 20. In India, the turnover thresholds are used in the
definition of a "combination"; because the CCI has jurisdiction only over "combina-
tions," it appears that it will not have the power to investigate transactions that do not
meet the applicable threshold(s). See CAA §§ 5, 6. In China, under Article 4 of the
Rules on Notification Thresholds, MOFCOM has the power to initiate an investigation if
there is "evidence showing that the concentration has or may have the effect of foreclos-
ing or restricting competition even where the relevant turnover thresholds are not met."
See supra note 62. The draft Interim Measures on Investigation and Handling of Sus-
pected Anti-competitive Concentrations that Do Not Meet the Notification Thresholds
clarify MOFCOM's procedures in respect of such cases. See China Clarifies Merger
Review Process, GLOBAL COMPETITION REw, January 20, 2009, available at http://www.
globalcompetistionreview.com/news/article/ 12730/china-clarifies-merger-review-pro-
cess; see also supra note 70.
209. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HoRIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
1-2 (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf
(describing the purposes of merger policy).
210. See, e.g., RECOMMENDED PRAcncEs, supra note 170, at 6.
211. See BAL arts. 54(4)-(5); see also AML (failing to impose a filing deadline); LPC
art. 30 (imposing a filing deadline in respect only of the post-merger notification); see
also infra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); infra note 221 and
accompanying text (discussing Russia); infra note 225 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing China).
212. See infra notes 223 and 224 and accompanying text.
213. See BAL art. 54(4).
214. CADE Resolution 15/98 established that "realization" of the transaction is the
moment when the parties sign a first binding document, or when there is any modifica-
tion in the competitive relation between them, or between them and third parties. See
CADE Resolution 15, supra note 88, art. 2. Subsequently, there was a sequence of differ-
ent interpretations of the triggering event, because CADE started to discuss not only
when the realization of a transaction took place, but also which was the first binding
agreement signed by the parties.
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every document, whether definitive or not, as binding.2 15 For example,
both confidentiality letters and "stand-still" agreements 2 16 executed at the
initiation of discussions between the parties have triggered a need to
file. 2 1 7 Failure to file on the basis of such documents was routinely prose-
cuted by CADE, notwithstanding the fact that the documents provided
nothing of a substantive nature to review. This standard subjected Brazil to
much criticism from within the international competition community. 2 18
CADE is gradually becoming more flexible in this respect and has
recently moved toward treating the definitive agreement as triggering the
obligation to notify, although care is still needed in drafting the terms of
preliminary documents such as letters of intent and memoranda of under-
standing in order to avoid triggering such an obligation. 2 19 The deadline
is strictly enforced and no extension is possible.2 20
2. Russia. In line with international norms and logic, Russia does
not impose a filing deadline in respect of the pre-merger filing notifica-
tion. 22 1 With respect to the post-merger notification only, a filing must be
made within forty-five calendar days from the consummation of the
transaction. 2 22
3. India. A combination must be notified within thirty days either
of: (1) approval by the Board of Directors of a merger proposal or (2) the
execution of an agreement setting out the parties' intent to convey control
215. GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2003
35 (2003).
216. An agreement whereby two or more parties agree not to deal with other parties
in a particular matter for a period of time, e.g., they enter into an agreement under
which the target agrees not to solicit an acquisition by another party, and the acquirer
agrees not to embark on another acquisition. This encourages the parties to invest more
heavily in the negotiation, due diligence, and details of a potential acquisition.
217. GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2003,
supra note 215, at 35.
218. See generally GLOBAL COMPETITION FORUM, IMPROVEMENTS ON BRAZILIAN ANTITRUST
PRACTICE, available at http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org/regions/s america/
Brazil/Microsoft%20Word%20-%201mprovements%20on%2OBrazilian%20antitrust%2
Opractice.pdf ("[U]pon the publication of the Resolution ... none of the interpretations
CADE had concerning [the] triggering event coincided with companies [sic.] and anti-
trust lawyers [sic.] opinion, who kept taking into consideration the criteria established
in the antitrust statute, and not in CADE's Resolution, which cannot, under any circum-
stance, change the [BAL]. This problem resulted in countless penalties imposed by
CADE on companies that notified their transaction following only the instructions of the
law, or even following one of CADE's different interpretations that, for some reason, was
no longer being adopted by the Commissioners. As a natural consequence, many suits
were filed before Federal Courts against CADE's decisions."); see also Mauro Grinberg &
Natalia Felix, Merger Control in Brazil: Maturity, GLOBAL COMPETITION REv., ANTITRUST
REVIEw OF THE AMERICAS 2009 79, 80 (2009), available at http://www.gcba.com.br/pdf/
008public.iaxmm2205 mauroenataliaO2.pdf.
219. Grinberg & Felix, supra note 218, at 80; see also GETrING THE DEAL THROUGH:
MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 67.
220. See GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 67.
221. See LPC arts. 27-28 (lacking a filing deadline in respect of pre-merger
notifications).
222. See id. arts. 30(1)-(3), (5).
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(including a letter of intent or memorandum of understanding). 223 It has
been suggested that because this requirement was included in the context
of the initial draft of the CAA, which provided for a voluntary, non-suspen-
sory regime, the CCI will in practice be flexible, extending the deadline at
the request of the parties, and allowing early notification to facilitate coor-
dination of filings in different jurisdictions. 22 4
4. China. China has a suspensory mandatory merger filing regime
and therefore, in line with international norms and logic, does not impose
a filing deadline. 225
B. Waiting Periods
Each of the BRIC jurisdictions, with the exception of Brazil (which has
no waiting period), imposes an initial waiting period (Phase 1), followed by
a subsequent waiting period (Phase 2).226 Russia and China impose a
Phase I waiting period of thirty days, followed by a Phase 2 period of vary-
ing duration if competition concerns arise.227 In contrast, India provides
for a Phase 1 period of thirty to sixty days, depending on the complexity of
the transaction.228 Although at first sight there appears to be no consensus
between the agencies as to whether business or calendar days are the cor-
rect measure to use, in practice it seems that each of the agencies applies
(or, in the case of India, will apply) calendar days to the waiting periods, 229
thus conforming with the U.S., rather than the E.U. model. 230
Each of the BRIC jurisdictions allows the parties to consummate the
transaction once the statutory waiting periods have expired, with the
exception of Russia, where clearance must be obtained regardless of
223. CAA § 6(2). Under regulation 6(2)(b) of the draft Merger Regulations, the exe-
cution of any other document that purports "to convey the bonafide intention to acquire
control" also triggers a filing. Competition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft of
(Combination) Regulations (200), reg. 6(2)(b). Therefore, a filing may also potentially
be required for a transaction that signs prior to the CAA coming into force, but closes
thereafter, in the event that any transaction documents are executed prior to or on clos-
ing. It is not yet clear whether the CCI will take this approach.
224. See ABA, PERSPECTIVES ON AMENDMENTS TO INDIA'S COMPETITION ACT 2002, supra
note 192.
225. See AML (lacking a filing deadline).
226. See supra note 85 (discussing Brazil); see also infra notes 245-246 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Russia); infra notes 250-254 and accompanying text (discussing
India); infra notes 256-258 and accompanying text (discussing China).
227. LPC arts. 33(1), 33(2)(2), 33(3); AML arts. 25, 26.
228. See CAA art. 31(11); see also Competition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed
Draft of (Combination) Regulations (200_), reg. 26(2).
229. Compare BAL art. 54 with the Antitrust Bill, which largely refers to business days.
See infra note 232. Additionally, see LPC art. 49(2) (referencing "working days;" all
other references to time requirements simply refer to "days," without clarifying whether
they are business or calendar days); CAA § 31(11) and infra notes 249-250 and accom-
panying text; AML arts. 25-26 and infra note 259 and accompanying text.
230. Compare 15 U.S.C. §18a(b) with Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January
2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings [hereinafter ECMR],
2004 OJ. (L24) 1 and Council Regulation 802/2004 of 21 April 2004 Implementing
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings [hereinafter Implementing Regulation], art. 8, 2004 O.J. (L 133), 1.
Vol. 43
2010 BRIC in the International Merger Review Edifice
whether the waiting period has expired.2 3 1
1. Brazil. As noted above, Brazilian law does not impose a
mandatory suspensory waiting period.2 32 However, CADE may impose an
injunction in cases involving a substantial horizontal overlap or important
vertical issues in order to preserve the competitive status quo in the rele-
vant market until CADE has reached a final decision. 233
Although the BAL does not impose a suspensory obligation on the
parties, the statute does impose deadlines by which the reviewing agencies
must complete their review.2 34 The SEAE has thirty calendar days after
notification to prepare its economic analysis and issue its recommenda-
tion.2 35 Subsequently, the SDE has thirty calendar days to complete its
own separate analysis. The reports from the SEAE and the SDE are submit-
ted to CADE, which has an additional sixty day period from the date of
receipt of the SDE report to issue its final decision.23 6 In 2003 and 2004,
the SEAE and SDE instituted various procedures in order to expedite the
merger review process,2 37 which can reduce the total duration of the agen-
cies' review to one to two months.238 The agencies may potentially com-
plete the entire review process prior to expiration of this period: CADE
recently issued its speediest merger clearance to date, requiring a mere
twenty-three business days from notification until authorization.2 39
The Federal Prosecutor General's Office and CADE's General Attor-
ney's Office may review the transaction prior to CADE's final decision and
issue non-binding opinions on legal issues raised by the transaction.240
It is important to note that if the agency requests information from the
231. See BAL art. 54(7); infra note 248 (discussing Russia); CAA art. 31(11); AML art.
25.
232. See supra note 85. The Antitrust Bill introduces a mandatory suspensory waiting
period and a process similar to that under the U.S. system. Antitrust Bill art. 88(3).
Within twenty days of submission of the complete filing, CADE must either issue a deci-
sion that the transaction causes no harm to competition, or seek the submission of com-
plementary documents. Id. art. 54. Once the complementary documents have been
provided by the parties, CADE must, within five business days, either declare the filing
complete, or seek an additional filing. Id. art. 55. Within fifty business days of the
complete filing, CADE may issue an opinion declaring the transaction complete or must
indicate that additional information is required. Id. art. 56. If CADE does issue the
ruling on completeness, it must either clear or prohibit the transaction within sixty busi-
ness days from submission of the filing. Id. art. 56. Alternatively, the additional infor-
mation gathering period must be completed within ninety days of the filing, and once
completed, CADE has ten business days to either approve or object to the transaction.
See supra note 30.
233. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
234. BAL art. 54.
235. BAL art. 54(6).
236. Id.
237. See infra notes 273-278.
238. GETrING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 67.
239. David Thorley, CADE Squeezes Through Juice Merger in Record Time, GLOBAL
COMPETITION REv., April 24, 2009, available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.
com/news/article/ 13305/cade-squeezes-juice-merger-record-time.
240. BAL arts. 10, 12; see also supra note 27.
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parties, the waiting period is suspended until the request is satisfied. 241
The Brazilian Federal Court, however, ruled in the Nestle/Garoto242 case
that each information request must be supported by a reasoned decision in
order to suspend the running of the waiting period and thus effectively
extend the deadline. 243 CADE has appealed the decision to the Brazilian
Federal Circuit Court but to date judgment remains pending.244
2. Russia. On expiration of the Phase 1 initial thirty calendar day
waiting period, FAS must clear the transaction if no competition concerns
are identified.245 If competition concerns are identified, FAS may choose
to prohibit the transaction, clear the transaction subject to conditions, or
extend the review process by an additional two month Phase 2 period. 246
If FAS grants a conditional clearance and defers clearance until the parties
have complied, it must set a deadline, not to exceed nine months, for the
parties to fulfill the relevant conditions. 247
Even if the statutory waiting periods have expired, however, the parties
are not free to close the transaction until they obtain clearance from
FAS. 248 Moreover, there is no provision for early termination.
3. India. Although the waiting periods are not explicitly stated in
"calendar days," elsewhere the CAA does explicitly refer to "working
days,"249 and thus implicitly the provision on waiting periods references
calendar days. The CAA provides for a total waiting period of 210 days
(approximately seven months) from the date of notification.250 This
unusually long suspensory waiting period has been criticized for creating
considerable uncertainty for businesses and as likely to cause delays in
multinational deals with an Indian element. 251
The CCI addressed this concern in its draft Merger Regulations, which
contemplate a three-stage waiting period: an initial assessment to be com-
pleted in Phase 1 (thirty days or sixty days, depending on the complexity of
241. BAL art. 54(8).
242. J.F.D.F.-4V.F., 2005.34.00.015042-8, 03.16.2007, available at http://www.jfdf.
jus.br (search by docket number).
243. Id.
244. See TRF-1, Ap. No. 2005.34.00.015042-8, Relator: Jojo Batista Moreira (pending
judgment).
245. LPC arts. 33(1), 33(2)(1).
246. Id. art. 33(2).
247. Id. art. 33(2)(3).
248. Id. arts. 27(1), 28(1), 29(1) requiring the parties to obtain FAS' consent prior to
consummation of the transaction; see generally id. (failing to provide an exception to this
obligation in the event that the relevant waiting periods expire prior to obtaining FAS'
consent).
249. See e.g., CAA § 29(2).
250. Id. § 31(11).
251. See PTI, CCI to Promote M&As by Fair Means, FINANCiAL ExPREss, April 13,
2009, available at http://www.financialexpress.com/news/cci-to-promote-m&as-by-fair-
means/446152 (in which Mr. Dhanendra Kumar, the chairman of the CCI, stated that
although the CAA provides for a waiting period of 210 days for giving clearance, "[It
doesn't mean that the [CCI] is going to take that much time ... we will try to do it as
quickly as possible.").
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the transaction);25 2 an extension of the investigation into Phase 2 (up to
105 days) if further information is required; 25 3 and if more information
and time is required, the investigation will enter the third phase (lasting the
reminder of the 210 days). 25 4
Once the 210-day period has expired the transaction is deemed to
have been cleared by the CCI.2 55
4. China. The AML gives MOFCOM thirty days for its Phase 1
review. 2 56 Before the expiration of Phase 1, MOFCOM must either clear
the transaction or initiate its Phase 2 review, which MOFCOM must com-
plete within ninety days of its decision to conduct the Phase 2 review.
25 7
MOFCOM can extend the Phase 2 review by an additional sixty days under
certain circumstances, including on agreement by the parties, or in the
event that further verification of documents is required or material changes
occur during the review.2 58 Although it is unclear from the legislation
whether the relevant periods refer to "calendar days" or "business days," it
appears from MOFCOM's treatment of the Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite Interna-
tional merger that in practice the time limits will be interpreted as calendar
days. 25 9
The Working Guidance creates a registration center for the submission
of notifications as an additional interface between the parties and the
MOFCOM case handlers.2 60 This registry system aligns MOFCOM with
international practice by creating a central registry to accept filings and
should resolve practical issues, such as the inability to make filings due to
the absence of certain MOFCOM officials.
252. Competition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft of (Combination) Regula-
tions (200), reg. 26(2).
253. See id. reg. 31.
254. The CAA provides deadlines within which the parties to the transaction, the
general public and/or the Director General may provide additional information regard-
ing the transaction or the parties may negotiate a remedy. See CAA §§ 29, 31. Under
the draft Merger Regulations these additional time periods are excluded from the calcu-
lation of the 210-day deadline. See Competition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft
of (Combination) Regulations (200), regs. 18(1), 19. Therefore, the deadline could
potentially extend beyond 210 days. It is unclear how this will operate in practice.
255. CAA § 31(11).
256. AML art. 25.
257. Id. art. 26.
258. Id.
259. In the Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite International transaction, the parties submitted
the merger notification filing on December 22, 2008 and MOFCOM accepted the filing
as complete on January 20, 2009; on February 20, 2009, MOFCOM initiated its Phase 2
investigation, which it indicated was due to end on May 20, 2009 (i.e., after thirty calen-
dar days); in the event, MOFCOM published its clearance decision on April 24, 2009,
prior to the expiration of the deadline. See [Ministry of Commerce of the People's
Republic of China] [MOFCOM], Announcement No. 28 of 2009, (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
MOFCOM Announcement No. 28 of 2009], available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aar-
ticle/ztxx/200904/20090406198805.html?416859071 1=3683028003.
260. See supra note 65. Under the pre-AML merger control regime, representatives of
the notifying parties directly submitted the notification to MOFCOM reviewers. See
supra note 60.
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Nonetheless, under the Working Guidance, the completeness of the
notification and the start of the Phase 1 review period-or the need for
further information-will not be confirmed until the MOFCOM case team
has reviewed the filing, some time after the transaction's submission to the
registration center. 2 6 1 There is no timetable prescribed for this initial
review by the case team. 26 2 Thus, despite the deadlines set out in the AML,
MOFCOM in practice controls the start date of the Phase 1 review period
and can potentially significantly extend the review period by refusing to
accept a notification as complete, thereby delaying the start of the review
clock until supplementary materials are submitted to MOFCOM's
satisfaction. 26 3
Moreover, the more formalized notification procedures set out in the
new Procedural Guidance (e.g., in relation to pre-notification discussions
and information requirements) may cause further delays in the notification
submission and acceptance process and increase the delay before
MOFCOM will start the clock for the review process.2 64
C. Pre-Filing Negotiations
Of the three BRIC jurisdictions that have implemented their merger
regimes, it appears that only Russia discourages pre-filing negotiations,
albeit Brazil will not entertain such discussions once the agreements have
been signed and the fifteen-day deadline for filing has started to run. Rele-
vant legislation in India has yet to come into effect, therefore creating
uncertainty regarding whether the CCI will permit, encourage, or refuse to
conduct pre-filing negotiations. In China, pre-notification discussions
were previously carried out on an informal basis, usually in the form of a
short briefing paper, and this practice is expected to continue under the
261. MOFCOM Working Guidance, supra note 65, art. 1.
262. See id.
263. In each of the InBev/Anheuser-Busch and Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite International
transactions, MOFCOM accepted the merger notification filing as complete only after
the parties had submitted supplemental information and/or documents. In InBev/
Anheuser-Busch, the filing was submitted on September 10, 2008 and accepted as com-
plete on October 27, 2009. See MOFCOM Announcement No. 95 of 2008, supra note 12.
In Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite International, Mitsubishi submitted the notification to
MOFCOM on December 22, 2008; the filing was accepted by MOFCOM as complete on
January 20, 2009. See MOFCOM Announcement No. 28 of 2009, supra note 259.
264. The new Procedural Guidance formalizes the pre-notification discussion process
by requiring the parties to submit a detailed written application (with documents and
materials relating to the transaction) before the pre-notification discussion. Because of
the extensive additional information requirements for the notification itself, it is likely
that many notifying parties may find it necessary to use the pre-notification discussion
process to try to obtain waivers for certain information requirements. To the extent that
the pre-notification discussion process must be used, the formalization of the process
may require more preparation time; it remains to be seen whether MOFCOM will insist
on significant amounts of information at this stage of the process. See MOFCOM Proce-
dural Guidance, supra note 63. The interrelationship between the pre-notification dis-
cussions and the post-submission "completeness review" will need to be considered in
each case to arrive at the best way of dealing with the information requirements as
efficiently as possible.
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new regime. 265
D. "Fast Track" vs. "Short-Form" vs. "Long-Form"
The "fast track" and "short-form" procedures are mechanisms to
enable transactions that do not raise substantive issues, or are below a cer-
tain value threshold, to be reviewed and cleared on an expedited basis.266
The fast track route provides a faster time frame for clearance, whereas the
short-form route allows the parties to provide less information and/or doc-
umentation, thus facilitating faster compliance with the notification
requirements. 267 Neither Russia nor China provides for such a system. 268
Although both Brazil and India provide for such a system, 269 at least in the
case of Brazil, the competition agency retains the right to revert to the more
comprehensive review process. 270 Although this approach is understanda-
ble from the competition policy perspective, it introduces an element of
uncertainty into the process for the parties.
1. Brazil. Brazil in theory utilizes both the fast track and short-form
procedures. 271 CADE introduced the short-form and long-form process in
1998, under which the parties made initial notification using a simplified
form; a second, more detailed form was provided in the event that CADE,
SEAE, and SDE decided to further investigate the transaction. 272
CADE subsequently introduced a faster review procedure for mergers
that clearly do not present substantive concerns in February 2003.273
Under this procedure, SEAE and SDE each has fifteen days to issue its opin-
ion;274 but, if SDE concurs with SEAE's opinion, SDE merely adds a para-
265. See MOFCOM Procedural Guidance, supra note 63; Measures on Notification of
Concentrations of Undertakings, supra note 68, art. 8; see also supra note 264.
266. See RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, supra note 170, at 10, 12.
267. See id.
268. See generally LPC (failing to provide a fast track or short-form notification); AML
(failing to provide a fast track or short-form notification); see also infra note 282 and
accompanying text (discussing Russia); infra notes 286-287 and accompanying text
(discussing China).
269. See SEAE/SDE Joint Ordinance No. 1, of February, 2003 art. 3, available at
http://www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/central-documents/legisaca/3-5-1-defesada-concor-
rencia/PORTARIA-1; see also OECD BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 39; U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development, Handbook on Competitive Legislation, 40-41, U.N. Doc. TD/
B/COM.2/CLP/64 (May 13, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Handbook on Competitive Legisla-
tion], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/c2clpd64_en.pdf; Competition
Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft of (Combination) Regulations (200_), regs. 6(1),
10, 26, forms 1, 2; infra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); infra note
283 and accompanying text (discussing India).
270. See infra notes 280-281.
271. See CADE Resolution No. 15, supra note 88, ch. 1, § I, art. 1; ch. II, § 1, art. 7,
Exhibits 1 and 2; see also SEAE/SDE Joint Ordinance No. 1, supra note 269; SEAE/SDE
Joint Ordinance No. 33/2006, of January 33, 2006, available at http://www.seae.
fazenda.gov.br/central documentos/notasimprensa/2006-1/portaria-conjunta-no-33-4-
de-janeiro-de-2006.
272. See CADE Resolution No. 15, supra note 88.
273. See SEAE/SDE Joint Ordinance No. 1, supra note 269.
274. See id. art. 3.
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graph to SEAE's opinion, memorializing its agreement with SEAE. 2 7 5 In
January 2004, SEAE and SDE further expedited the merger review process,
introducing a procedure whereby they both begin to review the transaction
immediately upon receipt of the filing, thus avoiding the delay inherent in
referring a case to SEAE and awaiting its analysis before SDE commences
work.2 7 6 SEAE and SDE subsequently submit a joint report to CADE,2 77
where it precedes all other transactions on CADE's docket, and CADE in
practice merely adopts SEAE's opinion as its decision. 278 It has been
reported that approximately 75% of cases reviewed by CADE are reviewed
under this procedure. 2 79 However, the simplified procedure is imple-
mented at the discretion of SEAE and SDE, which can revert to the regular
proceedings at any time.280 Further, if CADE deems that the case requires
a more detailed review, it can request at the decision stage that SEAE and
SDE conduct a full analysis.2 8 1
2. Russia. There is no provision in the LPC for a fast track or short-
form notification. 28 2
3. India. The draft Merger Regulations provide for long- and short-
form notification. 28 3 It has been suggested that short-form notification
will be appropriate in cases of new entry, a post-merger market share of
less than 15%, a failing firm defense, or a vertical merger with no overlap,
and that mergers notified using the short-form will be assessed by a desig-
nated division of the CCI in order to ensure their expedited review.28 4
Rather perversely, the draft Merger Regulations provide that if the parties
do not receive a request for additional information within thirty days of
receipt of a long-form notification and within sixty days of receipt of a
short-form notification, the merger will be deemed cleared. 28 5 A possible
justification for this approach is that, because the parties provide less infor-
mation in the case of a short-form notification, the CCI may need to revert
back to the parties in order to request additional information.
4. China. Although an early draft of the Rules on Notification
Thresholds included a provision for a formal expedited procedure, it was
275. See id. art. 5; see also U.N. Handbook on Competitive Legislation, supra note 269,
at 41.
276. Joint Procedure for Merger Review and Anticompetitive Conduct Analysis, which
was formalized by Joint Ordinance No. 33/2006, supra note note 271.
277. Id. art. 13.
278. See U.N. Handbook on Competitive Legislation, supra note 269, at 41.
279. OECD, Directorate for Fin. and Enter. Affairs Competition Comm., Global
Forum on Competition, Questionnaire on the Challenges Facing Young Competition Author-
ities, Contribution from Brazil, 4, DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2009) 51, Feb. 2, 2009, available
at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/6/42010868.pdf.
280. BRAZIL MERGER NOTIFICATION AND PROCEDURES TEMPLATE, supra note 96, at 7.
281. Id at 8.
282. See generally LPC (failing to provide for a fast track or short-form notification).
283. See Competition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft of (Combination) Regula-
tions (200-), reg. 6(1), forms 1, 2.
284. ABA, PERSPECTIVES ON THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO INDIA'S COMPETITION ACT,
supra note 192.
285. Competition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft of (Combination) Regula-
tions (200), reg. 26(2).
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not retained in the final version. 286 Moreover, the new Information
Requirement Guidance does not appear to envisage short-form notifica-
tion.287 Thus, the parties will need to use the pre-notification discussion
process in order to try to persuade the MOFCOM case team to grant spe-
cific waivers for information requirements that are either not practicable or
not possible to fulfill, particularly for those transactions that do not raise
substantive competition concerns. Nonetheless, as discussed above, the
Procedural Guidance has formalized the pre-notification discussion pro-
cess, which may itself create delays.288
E. Documents to Be Submitted
The document requirements are burdensome in each of the BRIC juris-
dictions, although arguably not more so than in more mature merger
regimes. However, Brazil and Russia each requires that translated docu-
ments be formally notarized, creating an additional procedural step.28 9
1. Brazil. The parties must submit with the filing certified copies of
all binding transaction documents, together with the most recent Annual
Report. 290 In the past, CADE has taken the position that this requirement
includes annexes and appendices to contracts, such as patent informa-
tion.291 Foreign documents must be translated and notarized.292 These
requirements can dramatically increase the burden on the parties when
filing. The parties also must identify all their board members who are on
the board of other companies in the same market, and provide any agree-
ment relating to the future administration of the combined entity (e.g., a
shareholder agreement). 293 CADE can also request supplementary docu-
ments, such as analyses, reports, and market studies prepared by the par-
ties, together with their financial reports for the three years preceding the
transaction. 294
In practice, these formal requirements are often waived by CADE,
286. See Alex Potter & Michael Han, Briefing, China Publishes Merger Control Notifica-
tion Thresholds, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, Aug. 4, 2008, http://
www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2008/augO5/23614.pdf; see also supra note 62.
The earlier draft was by the State Council Legislative Affairs Office. This draft not only
set out notification thresholds, but also covered other substantive and procedural issues.
Subsequently, it appears that the Office decided that addressing these issues in the final
draft would encroach on MOFCOM's sphere of responsibility. As a result, all such provi-
sions other than the notification thresholds were deleted from the final version.
287. See Information Requirement Guidance, supra note 64.
288. See supra notes 63, 264 and accompanying text.
289. See BRAZIL MERGER NOTIFICATION AND PROCEDURES TEMPLATE, supra note 96, at 12;
Alexander Egorushkin & Igor Panshensky, Russia, in GLOBAL LEGAL GROUP, MERGER CON-
TROL 2010, at 284, 286 para. 3.2 (2010), available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/
Publications/pdf/3282.pdf.
290. CADE Resolution No. 15, supra note 88, Exhibit I, Part Ill.
291. See CADE Resolution No. 15, supra note 88, Exhibit I, Part Ill; BRAZIL MERGER
NOTIFICATION AND PROCEDURES TEMPLATE, supra note 96, at 8-9.
292. BRAZIL MERGER NOTIFICATION AND PROCEDURES TEMPLATE, supra note 96, at 7, 9,
12.
293. CADE Resolution No. 15, supra note 88, Exhibit I, Part III.
294. Id. Exhibit II, Part Ill.
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SEAE, and SDE, and only if later requested must they be fulfilled. 29 5 This
is more common in investigative proceedings, where appeals to the courts
are likely, than in merger reviews.
In July 2008, CADE issued a resolution mandating electronic submis-
sion of filings, 29 6 which should further facilitate the merger notification
process, albeit the system will take effect only once SDE has declared for-
mally that it is up and running.29 7
2. Russia. The parties must submit with the filing a large number of
documents, 298 including: a signed copy or the latest draft of the share
purchase agreement or other document "explaining" the transaction (e.g., a
memorandum of understanding, a letter of intent, etc.); signed copies or
drafts of the loan documentation if the deal is financed other than by the
acquirer's own funds; the corporate and registration documents of the
acquirer and the target and their balance sheets (and, separately, the con-
solidated balance sheet of the acquirer's group); and information on the
business activities of the acquirer's Russian subsidiaries and the target for
the preceding two years.29 9 All non-Russian documents submitted to FAS
must be apostilled or legalized (with the exception of a share purchase (or
similar) agreement and loan documentation) and must also be translated;
subject to a few exceptions, the translator's signature must be certified by a
public notary.30 0
Reportedly, FAS has recently declined to approve two acquisitions due
to issues with paperwork, including incomplete filings and typographical
errors.
3 0 1
3. India. The parties must submit detailed information in the notifi-
cation to substantiate the market definition, together with a detailed analy-
sis of the competitive impact of the transaction. 30 2 In addition, they must
submit with the filing copies of filing notifications made and decisions
295. In practice, an executed translated copy of the transaction documents often suf-
fices and foreign documents may not need to be notarized or consularized. Annual
reports may be presented in their original language (often printed directly from the
internet) and are translated upon the request of the agency, which rarely happens.
Moreover, in practice, annexes and appendices need not be presented at the filing; if they
are considered necessary during the review, the agencies may request them. The only
certified copies that must be presented upfront are the powers of attorney and the
receipt for payment of the filing fee.
296. Ministrio da Justia, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica [CADE],
ResolucAo No. 49, de 23 de Julho de 2008 (Brazil), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/
Default.aspx?9393959b60be41192e2f.
297. See GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 67.
298. See LPC art. 32(5). A complete list of the documents to be submitted with the
filing is set out in Federal Antimonopoly Service Order No. 129, On Approval of Forms
Providing Antimonopoly Authorities Documents and Information when Filing Applica-
tions and Notifications Provided for by Articles 27 to 31 of the Law on Protection of
Commerce, Apr. 17, 2008.
299. See GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 303.
300. Id.
301. Disney's joint venture with MediaOne and Google's proposed acquisition of
Begun. See Knox, supra note 8.
302. Competition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft (Combination) Regulations
(200), reg. 6(1), forms 1, 2.
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obtained in other jurisdictions. 30 3
4. China. The parties must submit detailed information in the noti-
fication to substantiate the market definition and provide a detailed analy-
sis of the competitive impact on the Chinese market of the transaction. 30 4
Together with the notification, the parties must also submit the transaction
agreements, the audited financial and accounting reports of the parties for
the previous year, and any other documentation required by MOFCOM. 30 5
If the notification is filed by counsel, it must be accompanied by a power of
attorney.3 0 6
The new Information Requirement Guidance also introduces a
requirement that the parties provide certain reports and analyses that are
gathered either by the parties or others not involved in the transaction-
including feasibility studies, due diligence reports, industry development
reports, strategy reports for the transaction, and post-transaction forecast
reports.30 7 Certain practitioners have noted that "[w]hile filings in the
E.U. and U.S. also contain requirements to disclose internal documents,
MOFCOM's guidance does not contain any of the limitations on disclosure
usually contained in such requests - for example, that the documents must
have been prepared for or by a board member. '30 Practitioners have fur-
ther noted that "it likely will prove necessary to agree to a sensible disclo-
sure list with MOFCOM on a case-by-case basis" due to "the large amount
of internal documentation often generated in the preparation of transac-
tions."30 9 In light of these documentation requirements, some practition-
ers have concluded that practitioners will "need to observe a high level of
care in the preparation of internal documents." 3 10
With respect to potential substantive concerns, the Information
Requirement Guidance requires an explanation of the concentration's
effects on "competition in the relevant market."3 11 This explanation must
303. Id. form 1, item 12; form 2, item 12.
304. AML art. 23.
305. Id.; see also Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings, supra
note 68, art. 10.
306. Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings, supra note 68,
art. 10(1).
307. See supra note 64; see also Alex Potter, Connie Carnabuci & Michael Han, Brief-
ing: China's MOFCOM Publishes First Round of Merger Control Guidance, Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer, LLP, January 2009, at 2, available at http://www.freshfields.com/
publications/pdfs/2009/janO9/24964.pdf.
308. Potter, Carnabuci & Han, supra note 307, at 2; see also Council Regulation (EC)
No. 802/2004 of 21 April 2004 Implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004
on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, Form CO § 5.4, 2004 OJ.
(L 133) 1, 22, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
CONSLEG:2004RO802:20081023:EN:PDF; Hart-Scott-Rodino Act Notification and
Report Form for Certain Mergers and Acquisitions, Item 4(c), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/bc/hsr/P989316PMNRulesandFormallnterpretationsElectronicSubmission-
Instructions.pdf.
309. Potter, Carnabuci & Han, supra note 307, at 2.
310. Id.
311. Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings, supra note 68,
art. 10.
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address: (1) the transaction; (2) the relevant market, including market
shares of the parties and competitors, and entry barriers; and (3) the trans-
action's expected effects on competition, industrial development, techno-
logical progress, national economic development, and consumers. 3 12 All
documents, with the exception of annual reports and transaction docu-
ments, must be submitted in Chinese.3 13
F. Solutions, e.g., Hold-Separates
Hold-separates provide a mechanism for ensuring that the overall
transaction is not delayed by waiting for clearance in one jurisdiction, by
structuring the transaction so that the parties may close the main transac-
tion but hold separate the businesses in the jurisdiction(s) in which clear-
ance is still awaited.
1. Brazil. There is no mandatory suspensory waiting period; thus,
the parties technically are free to consummate the transaction prior to
obtaining clearance from the agency. 3 14 As discussed above, however,
CADE will issue an injunction to prevent the parties closing where there
are substantial horizontal overlaps or important vertical issues.3 15 In prac-
tice, such an injunction generally does not prohibit closing, but instead
imposes a hold-separate in respect of the Brazilian assets. Similarly, CADE
may also enter into agreements with the parties under which the parties
agree not to close or combine assets.3 16 CADE will also consider whether
remedies imposed in other jurisdictions resolve the anticompetitive effects
in Brazil (e.g., an order to divest a trademark used in Brazil). 3 17 Although
it is theoretically possible that CADE could issue an extra-jurisdictional
order, it has to date not done S0.318
2. Russia. The LPC does not provide for hold-separates, 3 19 although
312. Id.
313. Id. art. 12.
314. See Srgio Varella Bruna, Caio de Queiroz & Natalia S. Pinheiro da Silveira,
Merger Control-Brazil, LAT1NLAWYER, available at http://www.latinlawyer.com/refer-
ence/article/2738 1/brazil.
315. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. Examples of APROs into which
CADE has entered include in the GOL/VARIC, White Martins/Air Liquide, and Sadia!
Perdigdo transactions. The former involved the acquisition of a Brazilian airline by
another Brazilian airline. Under the terms of the APRO, the parties were obliged to hold
their administrative councils separate and the acquirer was obliged to maintain the tar-
get's assets and not to take decisions that would materially impact the target's economic
value (e.g., firing employees, reducing flight routes). In White Martins/Air Liquide, two
of the four players in the industrial gas industry proposed to create a JV for the sole
purpose of the construction of a ground plant. The APRO in this case was intended to
prevent information exchange and cartelization. In the Sadia/Perdigdo transaction, the
APRO imposed both structural and behavioral conditions, requiring the parties to keep
separate and independent their administrative, production and trade structures, and to
keep separate sensitive competitive information. See also Coca-Cola's acquisition of
Ledo Junior, in which CADE in August 2007 required the parties to execute an APRO.
317. GE-r-rING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 67.
318. See generally BAL art. 7 (granting CADE jurisdiction over any transaction that
may in any way affect the Brazilian market).
319. See generally LPC (failing to provide for hold-separates).
Vol. 43
2010 BRIC in the International Merger Review Edifice
such arrangements have been used on rare occasions in which Russian
issues held up a larger foreign transaction.3 20 Such arrangements have
not, however, to date been tested before FAS or in the Russian courts.
3. India. There is no specific provision for hold-separates in the
CAA;321 it remains to be seen whether the CCI will be receptive to such
solutions once the merger regime comes into effect.
4. China. The AML does not make specific provision for hold-sepa-
rates 3 22 and to date, there is little precedent on this issue; however, some
MOFCOM officials have suggested informally that such a solution might
be acceptable in a foreign-to-foreign merger. 32 3
G. Special Situations, e.g., Public Takeovers
Many jurisdictions impose a mandatory timetable on public takeovers,
which governs the latest date by which the bid must become uncondi-
tional. Therefore, in certain jurisdictions the competition agencies allow
such transactions to close prior to the parties obtaining merger clearance,
although there may be limits placed on the actions that the acquirer may
undertake in relation to the target.32 4 In the E.U., for example, the transac-
tion may be consummated, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the
rights attached to the acquired shares, or does so only to protect the full
value of its investment and on the basis of a derogation granted by the
European Commission. 32 5 In this case, there is a risk of subsequent forced
divestment if the transaction eventually is prohibited. 326 Other regimes
require the relevant competition agency to complete its review of such
transactions within a shorter time period. 32 7 For example, in the U.S. the
agencies have an initial review period of fifteen days, (instead of thirty days
as for other transactions), and in the case of a Phase 2 investigation, a
second review period of ten days (instead of thirty days) following substan-
tial compliance by the parties with the agencies' information request (the
so-called "Second Request"). 328 However, the BRIC jurisdictions do not
provide for similar solutions.
1. Brazil. There are no special rules for public takeovers.3 29 How-
ever, CADE has issued Stimula No. 3 consolidating its case law and stating
that a public tender must be notified within fifteen business days of the
320. GETrING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 303.
321. See generally CAA (failing to provide for hold-separates).
322. See generally AML (failing to provide for hold-separates).
323. GET-ING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 91.
324. See, e.g., ECMR, supra note 230, art. 7 (prescribing the circumstances under
which a public takeover may be consummated prior to completion of the merger review
process).
325. Id. art. 7(3).
326. See id. arts. 7(4), 8(3)-(4) (providing that where the EC Commission finds an
implemented transaction to violate the ECMR, it may order the dissolution of the trans-
action, or "any other appropriate measure").
327. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1).
328. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a(b)(1), (e)(2) (2000).
329. See generally BAL (failing to make specific provision for public takeovers).
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execution of the concession agreement.330
2. Russia. There are no special rules for public takeovers; 331 a filing
can be made on the basis of the announcement of the bid. If Russian clear-
ance is not obtained by the date on which the bid becomes unconditional,
neither FAS nor the courts can prevent the bidder from declaring the offer
unconditional and acquiring the target's shares. 3 32 However, in this case
FAS may impose sanctions on the entity and its officers for consummation
of a transaction prior to receiving clearance and/or start court proceedings
to invalidate the transaction.333 In a foreign-to-foreign transaction enforce-
ability is likely to be difficult, but reputational damage would occur.
3. India. There are no special rules for public takeovers. 334
4. China. There are no special rules for public takeovers.335 Under
Chinese law, the time limit for a public bid generally cannot exceed sixty
days,336 whereas the maximum time for obtaining merger clearance under
the AML is 180 days. 3 37 It is unclear how this apparent conflict will be
resolved in practice.
H. Comparative Timing Issues
Filing deadlines in a suspensory regime serve no purpose. Hopefully
India will clarify its policy and eschew such a requirement. 338 In contrast,
as long as Brazil does not suspend closing pending review,339 it will
require a filing deadline. Its management of this issue in the past has
earned CADE much criticism from the international competition
community. 340
If India's seven month final-stage review period is truly a maxi-
mum,34 1 reserved for exceptional cases only, the various BRIC waiting
periods342 are all reasonable. Obviously, it is necessary that each regime
330. S~imula No. 3, de 21 de setembro de 2007, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa
Economica, D.O. de 21.09.2007 (Brazil), available at: http://www.cade.gov.br/
Default.aspx?ba8d9d6bba5Oa46eb885d76fc3.
331. See generally LPC (failing to make specific provision for public takeovers).
332. See generally LPC.
333. LPC arts. 34(1)-(2); Kodeks RF ob Administrativnykh Pravonarusheniiakh
[KOAPI [Code of Administrative Violations] art. 19.8 (Russ.).
334. See generally CAA (failing to make specific provision for public takeovers).
335. See generally AML (failing to make specific provision for public takeovers).
336. [Measures on Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies] (promul-
gated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), July 31, 2006, effective
September 1, 2006) art. 37 (P.R.C.).
337. AML arts. 25-26 (describing the circumstances in which the usual 120-day wait-
ing period may be extended to 180 days).
338. CAA § 6(2). This is particularly important in light of the penalty that may
potentially be imposed for a failure to file within the relevant deadline. CAA § 43A; see
also infra note 514 and accompanying text.
339. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. As discussed previously, the Antitrust
Bill introduces a suspensory regime. Antitrust Bill arts. 88(3)-(4); see also supra notes
30 and 85.
340. Grinberg & Felix, supra note 218, at 79-80.
341. See supra note 251.
342. See supra notes 234-239 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); supra notes
245-247 and accompanying text (discussing Russia); supra notes 250-254 and accom-
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clarify, for example, how days are to be calculated.3 4 3 The Russian system
is curious, coupling suspensory review with the requirement for affirma-
tive approval, which appears to serve no purpose other than potentially
enabling the reviewing agency to ignore the legal period of review. Suspen-
sory regimes should consider "early termination" provisions, which permit
transactions posing no competition issue to close after the agency indicates
that it has no objection. 34 4
Pre-filing discussions should not be compelled, but neither should
they be discouraged.3 45 It is the senior author's view, having experienced
both models, that pre-filing negotiations are often very productive and can
save both the agency and the parties valuable time and resources.
All BRIC regimes require the parties to submit a very large number of
documents. 34 6 Brazil's recent change to permit electronic filings will, once
implemented, 34 7 hopefully ameliorate the formalistic busy-work that his-
torically has been required. One cannot fault an agency that wants relevant
documents translated into the national language. Nonetheless, a certain
degree of flexibility in this regard would appreciably reduce the cost and
time burdens on the parties without significantly impacting the ability of
the relevant agency to conduct its review.348
Whether hold-separates are permissible in Russia, India, and China is
unclear,3 49 and their use poses difficult questions. On the one hand,
mechanisms that permit large international transactions to close, holding
separate domestic assets pending agency review, offer a solution to the sit-
uation in which one regime could otherwise impede the closing of a mul-
tinational deal.3 5 0  On the other hand, hold-separates can, if
panying text (discussing India); supra notes 256-258 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing China).
343. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, supra note 170, at 9.
345. The International Competition Network (ICN) notes that "[slome jurisdictions
find it valuable to hold pre-notification guidance sessions in appropriate cases, for exam-
ple, where the competition agency has experience in the sector and/or where the parties
have provided sufficient information prior to notification to permit the competition
agency to formulate preliminary views." RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, supra note 170, at 14;
see also infra notes 615-617 and accompanying text (discussing the ICN).
346. See supra notes 290-294 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); supra notes
298-299 and accompanying text (discussing Russia); supra notes 302-303 and accom-
panying text (discussing India); supra notes 304-306 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing China).
347. See supra notes 296-297 and accompanying text.
348. In this regard, it is regrettable that the final version of the Measures on Notifica-
tion of Concentrations of Undertakings did not include a provision (which had
appeared in the initial draft) permitting the submission of Chinese summaries of docu-
ments, rather than requiring full translations. See Measures on Notification of Concen-
trations of Undertakings, supra note 68, art. 12; see also draft Interim Measures on
Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings, supra note 160.
349. See supra note 319 and accompanying text (discussing Russia); supra note 321
and accompanying text (discussing India); supra note 322 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing China).
350. See George S. Cary, Senior Deputy Director, Bureau of Competition, Fed. Trade
Comm'n, Remarks at the American Bar Association Spring Antitrust Meeting (Apr. 10,
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inappropriately structured, leave the reviewing agency with no effective
remedy where the held-separate assets are not independently viable. 3 5 1
Nonetheless, used in appropriate cases and structured with care, hold-sepa-
rates should permit an agency to continue its review after others have com-
pleted theirs and the transaction has closed.
Public takeovers present unique issues. Both the E.U. and the U.S.
address the issue but in different ways. The European approach places the
burden and the risk on the parties; the parties must apply for a derogation
and subsequently have limited rights with respect to the acquired
shares. 35 2 In the event that substantive issues arise, the agency may
impose remedies. 3 53 In contrast, the U.S. approach imposes an obligation
on the relevant agency to expedite its review, and the parties may proceed
to close without risk once the applicable deadline(s) has/have expired.3 5 4
None of the BRIC jurisdictions appears to have addressed these issues, and
it is recommended that they do so.
V. Substantive Assessment
A. Standard of Review
The Brazilian and Russian regimes focus on the "dominant position"
test,3 55 although it appears that there is a move away from a dogmatic reli-
ance on market shares, and more openness to effects-based arguments in
the newer Chinese and Indian regimes. 3 56
1. Brazil. The Brazilian law includes both a dominant position and a
"restriction of competition" test.3 5 7 A transaction is objectionable if it may
limit or otherwise restrain open competition, or result in the control of
1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/other/aba397.shtm; FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT MERGER CONSENT ORDER PROVISIONS,
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/mergerfaq.shtm#Hold Separate Orders; see also ICN MERGER
WORKING GROUP: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK SUBGROUP, MERGER REMEDIES REVIEW PROJECT,
REPORT FOR THE FOURTH ICN ANNUAL CONFERENCE 39-40 (2005), http://www.interna-
tionalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc323.pdf.
351. See Staff of the Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, A Study
of the Commission's Divestiture Process 10-12 (1999), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf (finding that the divestiture of an ongoing business is more
likely to be successful than the divestiture of selected assets).
352. ECMR, supra note 230, arts. 7(2)-(3); see also supra note 325 and accompanying
text.
353. ECMR, supra note 230, arts. 7(4), 8(3)-(4); see also supra note 326 and accompa-
nying text.
354. Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006); see also supra note 328 and
accompanying text.
355. GETrING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 67, 304;
Torsten Syrbe & Evgeny Khokhlov, Merger Control: Getting the Deal Cleared in Russia,
Clifford Chance, L.L.P., Feb. 2010, at 4.3, available at http://www.cliffordchance.com/
showimage/showimage.aspx?LanglD=UK&binaryname=/Merger%20control%20-%20
getting%20the%20deal%20cleared%20in%20russia%20(eng)%20feb10%20(282787%
20v4a).pdf.
356. See infra note 386 (discussing India); infra note 392 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing China).
357. BAL art. 54.
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relevant markets for products or services. 358 In practice, most of CADE's
decisions focus on the dominant position test and, as a result, CADE will
generally clear a transaction if it determines the transaction will not create
or strengthen a dominant position.35
9
The relevant market is defined using the hypothetical monopolist test,
i.e., the most restricted group of products in the most restricted area ena-
bling a potential monopolist to introduce a "small but significant non-tran-
sitory increase in price" (SSNIP). 360 The increasing sophistication of the
market definition analysis conducted by CADE is demonstrated in its
recent decision to clear the Philips/Dixtal merger, based on its distinction
between the relevant premium and non-premium markets.3 6 '
The Merger Guidelines issued jointly by the SEAE and the SDE (Brazil
Merger Guidelines) provide for the analysis of both unilateral and coordi-
nated effects. 3 62 In the case of a unilateral effects theory, a market share of
at least 20% will raise a significant prospect of post-merger market
power; 36 3 under a theory of coordinated harm, the threshold is a four-firm
concentration ratio of at least 75%, together with a merged entity market
share of at least 10%.364 Although the Guidelines do not discuss the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), it appears that the agencies nonethe-
less do calculate the HHI in order to assist in their determination of market
concentration. 36
5
Once the relevant market has been defined and the market shares cal-
culated, the probability that the merged entity will in fact exercise market
power must be assessed. 36 6 This assessment involves consideration of
such factors as imports, entry (which must be "probable, timely, and suffi-
cient"3 67 ), and market dynamism, including the extent to which other mar-
ket players have both the capacity and the motivation to resist attempts by
358. Id.
359. GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 67.
360. Decreto No. 50, de agosto de 2001, D.O.U. de 16.08.2001, paras. 28-33 (Brazil)
[hereinafter Decreto No. 501, available at http://www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/document-
center.
361. The acquisition by Philips Medical Systems (the healthcare arm of the electronics
group) of Dixtal (the leading Brazilian manufacturer of vital signs monitors) was cleared
without conditions, based on CADE's market definition findings. CADE agreed with the
parties' arguments that there was a premium and non-premium market. Philips oper-
ated in the premium market, together with competitors such as Draeger Siemens and
GE, all of which have high levels of technological innovation and sell to leading, high-
standard hospitals and clinics. In contrast, Dixtal operated in the non-premium market,
together with other local and Asian players, with less sophisticated and cheaper prod-
ucts aimed at low-end hospitals and clinics. See Sebastian Perry, Philips Wins Approval
for Vital Signs Merger, GLOBAL COMPETITION REv., May 20, 2009, available at http://
www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/15579/philips-wins-approval-vital-
signs-merger/.
362. Decreto No. 50, supra note 360, para. 15.
363. Id. para. 36(a).
364. Id. para. 36(b).
365. See OECD BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 29-30.
366. Decreto No. 50, supra note 360, paras. 39-69; see also OECD BRAZIL REPORT,
supra note 2, at 29.
367. Decreto No. 50, supra note 360, paras. 19(b), 45, 47.
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the merged entity to exercise market power.3 68 If it is found probable that
the merged entity will exercise market power, efficiencies generated by the
transaction may be taken into account. 36 9 Finally, the net economic effect
of the transaction is evaluated. 3 70 A transaction will be found anticompeti-
tive if, after accounting for efficiencies, it will produce a net decrease in
economic surplus.37 1 If surplus will increase, because the anticompetitive
effects are outweighed by efficiencies, further analysis is required.3 7 2
Vertical issues also are becoming more important, and several reme-
dies have been imposed based on foreclosure theories or arguments analo-
gous to essential-facilities. 373
2. Russia. FAS will prohibit, or impose conditions on, a transaction
that creates or strengthens a dominant position or otherwise leads to a
limitation of competition on the relevant Russian market.37 4 The LPC
defines dominance as a position held by a single entity (or by several enti-
ties) in a market for a specific product or service that allows it (or them) to
materially influence the terms of trade of such product or service, to
exclude other companies from the market, or to impede competitors' access
to the market.3 75
The market share figures used by FAS in its analysis are obtained from
the Federal Service of State Statistics, market research agencies and/or the
parties;3 7 6 the market share data provided by the parties to FAS may be
based on internal estimates, official statistics or reports by independent
third party agencies.3 7 7
368. See BAL art. 54(1); see also Decreto No. 50, supra note 360, paras. 39-69.
369. See Decreto No. 50, supra note 360, paras. 70-84.
370. See id. paras. 85-92.
371. See OECD BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 29.
372. Id.
373. See, e.g., GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at
68; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text. See also the AmBev case, in which
CADE required (among other remedies) Ambev to divest the "Bavaria" brand, together
with five breweries located in different regions of Brazil and to provide the purchaser
with access to the Brahma distribution system for a period of four years, with an option
to extend for a further two years. OECD, ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN BRAZIL 4 (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/52/49/
2406761.pdf.
374. LPC arts. 33(2)(2), 33(2)(5).
375. Id. arts. 5(1), 5(3), 5(6), 5(7). There are specific rules for finding dominance in
the financial sector; a financial organization is presumed not dominant if its market
share does not exceed 10% where there is a single Russian market or 20% where there is
more than one Russian market on which the products are sold. LPC art. 5(7); see also
Government Resolutions No. 359, dated June 9, 2007, and No. 499, dated June 26,
2007.
376. The Role of Economic Analysis in Competition Law Enforcement in Russia, Con-
ference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, Antalya, Turk., Nov. 14-18, 2005,
available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/tdrbpconf6p036-en.pdf; see
also Jacky Baudon & Alexander Viktorov, Merger Control in Russia: Key Questions and
Answers, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, LLP, May 2007, at 6 [hereinafter Freshfields
Russia Memo], available at http://www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/2007/may
14/18567.pdf.
377. Freshfields Russia Memo, supra note 376, at 6.
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As a general rule, there is a safe harbor with respect to market shares
of 35% or less,3 78 except in a situation of collective dominance; if the col-
lective market share of up to the top three companies in the market exceeds
50% or, in the case of up to the top five companies, exceeds 70%, there is a
rebuttable presumption that each of these companies is dominant 379 pro-
vided that:
1) The market share of each is not less than 8%;
2) The market share of each has been stable over a period of time not
less than one year; 38 0
3) The relevant products of each have no substitutes;
4) Access by new entrants to the market is restricted;
5) Price increase does not result in a proportionate decline in
demand; and
6) Information on the price of the product and the terms of its sale or
purchase is accessible to an indefinite number of parties. 38 1
Nonetheless, under the LPC Amendment, FAS may find that a single
company is dominant even if its market share is less than 35% if the com-
pany's market share is greater than the market shares of its competitors,
and the company can materially influence the general terms of trade in the
relevant market, provided that:
1) The company can unilaterally determine price and has decisive
influence on the general terms of trade in the relevant market;
2) Entry to the relevant market is impeded due to, inter alia, eco-
nomic, technological, administrative or other limitations;
3) The goods may not be substituted; and
4) The change in price of the goods does not lead to a decrease in
demand.38 2
Moreover, there is a rebuttable presumption of single-firm dominance
where a party has a market share of over 50%.383 When considering
whether the transaction will create or strengthen a dominant position for
market shares between the 35% and 50% thresholds, and to rebut the pre-
sumption of dominance in the event that the 50% threshold is exceeded,
FAS considers other market factors. 384 The factors that FAS will consider
include: an increase in concentration; stability of market shares; competi-
tors' market shares; the possibility of entry; and other circumstances that
allow a company or companies to unilaterally influence trade. 385
378. LPC art. 5(2).
379. Id. arts. 5(3)(1), 5(4).
380. Id. art. 5(3)(2). Or less if the relevant market has existed for less than one
year. Id.
381. Id. art. 5(3).
382. Id. art. 5(61).
383. LPC art. 5(1)(1) (providing that a company may be found not dominant even if
this threshold is exceeded).
384. See LPC arts. 5(1), 5(3).
385. Id.
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3. India. The CAA introduces an effects-based test prohibiting any
combination that causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect
on competition within the relevant market in India.3 8 6 The CAA identifies
a non-exhaustive list of factors that are relevant to determining whether a
transaction has such an effect but does not attempt either to rank them in
importance or to impose the order in which the CCI must consider or
address them.3 8 7 The relevant factors include:
1) Actual and potential competition from imports;
2) Market concentration;
3) Barriers to entry;
4) Degree of countervailing power;
5) Likelihood of post-transaction price or margin increase(s);
6) Removal of a vigorous and effective competitor;
7) Nature and extent of vertical integration;
8) Failing firm defense; and
9) Whether the benefits of the transaction outweigh its adverse
impact. 38s
Market concentration is determined on the basis of the relevant prod-
uct and geographic markets. 38 9 The product market definition emphasizes
demand-side rather than supply-side substitutability.390 The geographic
market is defined as "the area in which the conditions of competition for
supply of goods or services, or demand for goods or services, are distinctly
homogenous and can be distinguished from the conditions prevailing in
the neighboring areas."39 1
4. China. MOFCOM must prohibit a transaction that "has or is
likely to have the effect of eliminating or restricting competition. '39 2 Fac-
tors relevant to determining whether a transaction has such an effect
include:
1) The parties' market shares and market power;
2) Market concentration;
3) The transaction's effect on "market access" and "technology
development;"
4) The transaction's effect on consumers and other undertakings;
5) The transaction's effect on "the national economic development;"
and
386. CAA § 6(1).
387. Id. § 20(4).
388. Id. §§ 20(4)(a)-(n).
389. Id. § 2(r).
390. Id. § 2(t) (defining "relevant product market" as all the "products or services
which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of
characteristics of the products or services, their prices and intended use") (emphasis
added).
391. Id. § 2(s).
392. AML art. 28.
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6) Any other factors that affect the relevant market as determined by
MOFCOM.
3 9 3
As recognized by the Guidelines for the Definition of the Relevant
Product Market, the relevant market must first be defined in order to deter-
mine market concentration, power and shares. 3 9 4 The principles intro-
duced for doing so are generally in line with international norms.
Substitutability generally will be dispositive in respect of the product mar-
ket, with an emphasis on demand-side, rather than supply-side, substitu-
tion.3 95 In complex cases, MOFCOM will use the hypothetical monopolist
test (the so-called SSNIP test 3 96 ).39 7 The issue of a pre-existing, non-com-
petitive price is addressed, and provision is made for a different benchmark
to be taken. 398 The price ranges to be applied by the SSNIP test may differ
from 5% to 10%, depending on the circumstances and industry, and differ-
ing price ranges may be applied to different categories of customers and/or
geographic areas. 3 99
Homogeneity of competition conditions is paramount with respect to
the geographic market.40 0 Interestingly, the concept of "timeliness" is
explicitly introduced in relation to products characterized by, for example,
production cycle, service life, seasonal factors, fashion or the duration of
intellectual property rights (IPR). 40 1
There were concerns that MOFCOM might apply the AML favorably
toward domestic industries as a result of the inclusion of factors such as a
transaction's effect on "market access" and "technology development" in
the AML.4 0 2 These concerns were exacerbated during the drafting of the
AML because of criticism of alleged abuses of IPR by, and the high market
shares in China of, non-domestic companies in high-technology indus-
393. Id. arts. 27(1)-(6).
394. Guidelines for the Definition of the Relevant Product Market, supra note 67, art.
2.
395. Id. art. 3 (defining "relevant product market" as "a market comprised of a group
or a category of products that are considered by the consumers to have a relatively close
substitution relationship based on factors such as characteristics, uses and prices of the
products."); see also id. art. 8.
396. See supra text accompanying note 360 (discussing the SSNIP test generally).
397. Guidelines for the Definition of the Relevant Product Market, supra note 67, arts.
7, 10; see also id. art. 10.
398. Id. art. 11.
399. Id. art. 10.
400. Id. art. 3 (describing the "relevant geographic market" as a geographic area
within which consumers acquire the products that have relatively strong substitution
relationships).
401. Id.
402. AML art. 27(3); see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010
NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT-CHINA 32 (2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
sites/default/files/uploads/reports/2010/NTE/2010NTEChina-final.pdf (noting that
the U.S. urged China not to use the AML to pursue industrial policy objectives and to
ensure that the relevant implementing measures do not create barriers to trade or treat
foreign goods or investments less favorably).
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tries.403 Nonetheless, these concerns do not appear to have materialized in
the Guidelines for the Definition of the Relevant Product Market.40 4
To date, MOFCOM has prohibited one transaction 40 5 and imposed
remedies in respect of five transactions. 40 6 MOFCOM's prohibition of the
Coca-Cola/Huiyuan transaction appears not to have been based on con-
cerns related directly to the horizontal overlap between the parties; rather,
its decision was based on Coca-Cola's ability to leverage its dominant posi-
tion in the carbonated drinks market over the juice market, increase entry
barriers and harm the ability of smaller domestic competitors to both com-
pete effectively and innovate.40 7
In contrast, MOFCOM imposed a remedy in the Mitsubishi/Lucite
transaction based on the parties' combined market share of 64%,408 which
was much higher than the second and third largest participants, and which
403. See Niraj Chokshi, Bracing for China Monopoly Law, CAL LAw: CALIFORNIA'S LEGAL
NEws SOURCE, July 9, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=120242
2835203.
404. See Guidelines for the Definition of the Relevant Product Market, supra note 67,
art. 3 (referencing IPR solely in relation to timeliness and the requirement that, in a
review of issues such as technology trade and/or licensing agreements, factors including
IPR, innovation, and technology markets must be considered).
405. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing Coca-Cola/Huiyuan).
406. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing InBev/Anheuser-Busch);
supra note 259 and infra note 408 and accompanying text (discussing Mitsubishi/
Lucite); infra note 412 and accompanying text (discussing GM/Delphi). In Pfizer/Wyeth,
MOFCOM required the companies to divest part of their animal drug portfolio.
MOFCOM Announcement No. 77 of 2009, MOFCOM Decision on the Conditions of
Approval of Pfizer's Acquisition of Wyeth (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://
fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200909/20090906541443.html. In Panasonic/Sanyo
MOFCOM cleared the transaction subject to the divestiture of certain battery production
facilities and also required Panasonic to reduce its stake in a joint venture with Toshiba
to below 20% (i.e., from 40% to 19.5%). MOFCOM Announcement No. 82 of 2009,
MOFCOM Decision on the Conditions of Approval of Matsushita's acquisition of Sanyo
(30 Oct. 2009), available at http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200910/
20091006593175.html; see also Rosalind Donald, China Clears Panasonic/Sanyo, GLOBAL
COMPETITION REv., Nov. 2, 2009, available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/
news/article/19256/china-clears-panasonic-sanyo.
407. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
408. The parties agreed to implement one of two remedy packages: (1) "capacity sep-
aration," whereby Lucite's Chinese entity is to divest 50% of its annual methyl methacry-
late (MMA) output to one or more independent third party buyers for a period of five
years at cost; or (2) "complete separation," whereby, if within six months (extendable by
six months by MOFCOM) after the main transaction closes, the merged entity is not able
to perform the capacity separation, MOFCOM may appoint a divestment trustee to over-
see the sale of 100% of the Lucite Chinese entity. Lucite China and Mitsubishi agreed to
operate independently with separate management teams and boards of directors until
the relevant separation, during which time the parties are to continue to compete with
one another in the sale of MMA in China, and are prohibited from exchanging informa-
tion on Chinese pricing, customer information and other competitively sensitive infor-
mation. MOFCOM Announcement No. 28 of 2009, supra note 259. Mitsubishi/Lucite
further agreed not to, without MOFCOM's prior approval, in the five years following
completion of the transaction: (1) acquire a manufacturer in China of MMA or PMMA or
related products; or (2) establish facilities in China to manufacture MMA. Id.
Vol. 43
2010 BRIC in the International Merger Review Edifice
would have given the parties a controlling position in China.40 9 Thus, the
parties could potentially have eliminated and restricted competition post-
transaction. Moreover, because Mitsubishi was active also on a down-
stream market, the parties could potentially have foreclosed downstream
competitors due to their dominance in the upstream market. Similarly, in
respect of Pfizer's acquisition of Wyeth, MOFCOM imposed a remedy
based on a horizontal overlap in the swine mycoplasma pneumonia vaccine
market, resulting in a post-merger market share of 49.4% and a HHI of
2182, with an increase of 336.410 MOFCOM also considered that market
entry was difficult due to the investment needed, the long development
time and technological barriers.4 1 1 In the GM/Delphi transaction,
MOFCOM's review focused on the upstream and downstream vertical rela-
tionships between the parties; MOFCOM ultimately cleared the transaction
subject to behavioral remedies. 4 12
B. Defenses
Each of the BRIC jurisdictions provides the opportunity for the parties
to counter any substantive concerns raised by the relevant antitrust agency
with efficiencies arguments and/or other positive benefits of the
transaction.4 13
1. Brazil. As discussed above, CADE will balance a transaction's
resulting efficiencies and benefits to consumers against its anticompetitive
effects.4 14 The competition agency will accept an efficiencies defense only
if the economic benefits of the transaction are equitably allocated between
the merging parties and consumers or end-users. 4 15 Moreover, it appears
that CADE will consider the failing firm defense, which the Brazil Merger
Guidelines do not reference, although CADE has not yet cleared a merger
on this basis. 4 16
409. Id.; see also Matthew Bachrack, Cunzhen Huang, & Jay Modrall, Merger Control
Under China's Antimonopoly Law: the First Year, CHINA Bus. REv., Jul.-Aug. 2009, at 18,
available at http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/public/0907/aml.html.
410. MOFCOM Announcement No. 77 of 2009, supra note 406.
411. See id.
412. MOFCOM Announcement No. 76 of 2009, MOFCOM Decision in General
Motors Limited's Acquisition of Delphi Corporation (Sept. 28, 2009), available at http://
fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/ztxx/200909/20090906540211 .html.
413. See BAL art. 54(1); Decreto No. 50, supra note 360, paras. 70-84; LPC art. 13;
CAA §§ 20(4)(m)-(n); AML art. 28.
414. See BAL art. 54(1); Decreto No. 50, supra note 360, paras. 70-84; see also supra
notes 369-372 and accompanying text (discussing efficiencies and balancing the pro
and anticompetitive effects of a transaction under the Brazil Merger Guidelines, which
were promulgated in Decreto No. 50).
415. BAL art. 54(1)(I); Decreto No. 50, supra note 360, para. 87. Moreover, CADE
will find a merger lawful only if consumers or end-users are not harmed. BAL art. 54(2).
416. See In re Mahle GmbH (rejecting an auto-parts manufacturer's failing firm
defense). In its decision, CADE construed the defense in accordance with the formula-
tion developed in the U.S. OECD BRAZIL REPORT, supra note 2, at 30. Further, CADE has
continued to reject this defense usually on the grounds of "inadequate efforts to identify
less anti-competitive purchasers." Id.
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2. Russia. If the parties can show that the positive effects of the
transaction, particularly in a socio-economic context, outweigh its negative
effects, then FAS may approve the transaction.4 17 Thus, FAS will balance a
transaction's resulting efficiencies against its anticompetitive effects. 4 18
3. India. Under the CAA, the CCI must consider all relevant factors,
such as economic efficiencies and the failing firm defense, when determin-
ing the anticompetitive effects of a combination. 4 19
4. China. The AML allows MOFCOM to clear an anticompetitive
transaction if the parties can show that the positive effects of the transac-
tion significantly outweigh its negative effects on competition or that the
transaction is in the public interest.4 20 This suggests that economic effi-
ciencies may be considered during the review process.
C. Non-Competition Issues, e.g., Public Policy, National Security,
Interaction with Regulated Sectors
When a competition agency considers non-competition concerns dur-
ing the review process, it is obviously more difficult to accurately predict
the outcome of the review.42 1 There also may be a perception that non-
competitive considerations are considered in order to protect domestic
companies at the expense of foreign entities.
1. Brazil. Although the analyses and decisions of the reviewing
agencies largely tend to be based solely on competition grounds, the agen-
cies may take other factors into consideration, such as the public interest
and the transaction's effects on the Brazilian economy and consumer
interests. 42 2
No particular sector or industry, such as any regulated industry, is
excluded from the notification requirements, and no particular sector or
industry enjoys special threshold calculations. 423 However, procedural dif-
ferences do exist. 4 2 4
417. LPC art. 13.
418. Id. This balancing typically occurs when the parties plan to enter into a com-
mercial contract that may limit competition and make a special filing with FAS to obtain
its prior approval. Nonetheless, there are no obstacles to taking the same approach in
the merger control context.
419. CAA §§ 20(4)(k), (m)-(n); see also supra note 388 and accompanying text.
420. AML art. 28.
421. See RECOMMENDED PRACTIcEs, supra note 170, at 23 (discussing the need for
transparency when considering such factors).
422. See BAL art. 54(2).
423. See generally BAL.
424. For example, telecommunications mergers are filed with CADE through the
National Telecommunications Agency, and unless another sector is also involved, SEAE
and SDE do not participate in the review. Decreto No. 9472, de 16 de julho de 1997
[National Telecommunications Act of 1997], arts. 7, 19(XIX); OECD BR zIL REPORT,
supra note 2, at 19. A jurisdictional dispute between CADE and the Central Bank was
recently resolved, and CADE now has responsibility for regulating mergers in the bank-
ing sector. See Brazil's Council for Economic Defense, http://ftp.cade.gov.br/
Default.aspx?5aed3ccd27fcl3101a273c0a5f. Moreover, in the insurance, public health,
oil and gas, and electricity sectors, special clearance must be obtained from the relevant
sectoral regulators. Bruna, de Queiroz & Pinheiro da Silveira, supra note 314.
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2. Russia. Specific rules govern transactions involving financial
organizations, and those rules address both the jurisdictional issues
regarding the notification requirement 4 25 and the substantive review. 4 26
Because parties must submit certain filings to FAS that are unrelated
to competition law, 42 7 this potentially may give rise to the perception and/
or the possibility that FAS may transfer its consideration of factors unre-
lated to competitive effects when reviewing mergers. If a non-Russian com-
pany acquires, directly or indirectly, a triggering stake in a Russian
company that is active in a strategic sector,4 28 the non-Russian company
must make such a filing to FAS.4 29 If any entity owned or controlled by a
foreign state acquires negative control over a Russian company of strategic
importance, the entity is subjected to a filing requirement; 430 in some
cases, the shareholding threshold for triggering the filing requirement is
even lower. 43 1 Moreover, certain industries have restrictions on the
amount of foreign investment permitted.4 32
If the merger control filing is made together with a filing under foreign
investment laws, FAS typically does not issue a merger control approval
until the deal is cleared from a "strategic" or "state ownership" perspective.
3. India. Although the CCI must as a general rule take into account
only competition factors in its review, 4 33 the central government can
exempt classes of enterprises from the application of the CAA if the govern-
ment deems it necessary in the public interest or in the interest of national
425. See LPC arts. 27(1)(3), 29, 30(3)-(4), (6).
426. See id. art. 5(7) (providing for specific rules for finding dominance in the finan-
cial sector); see also supra note 374 and accompanying text (discussing dominant posi-
tion test).
427. See id. art. 33(2)(6); see also Procedures for Foreign Investments in the Business
Entities of Strategic Importance for Russian National Defence and State Security, Resolu-
tions of the State Duma and Federation Council of the Federal Assembly, April 29,
2008, Federal Law No. 57-FZ, art. 8 [hereinafter Strategic Filing Law] (governing the
filing obligation).
428. See Strategic Filing Law supra note 427, art. 6 (indicating that there are forty-two
such sectors, including weapons and military equipment, nuclear materials or radioac-
tive substances, aviation security, space exploration, explosives, oil, gas and mineral
deposits of federal significance and significant mass media).
429. See id. art. 7 (indicating that although the size of the stake that triggers such a
filing varies according to the sector, a filing is generally required if control is acquired
through the acquisition of a fifty percent or greater shareholding or through the acquisi-
tion of a smaller stake with additional rights such as acquisition of negative control).
430. See id. art. 2(3) (indicating that a state-owned or state-controlled non-Russian
acquirer must make a separate filing where it directly or indirectly acquires a stake in
any Russian company that exceeds 25% or otherwise permits the blocking of corporate
decisions).
431. See id. art. 7(5) (indicating that a filing may be required in respect of the acqui-
sition of a 5% stake when the target involves subsurface deposits of federal significance
and/or the acquirer is state-owned).
432. See e.g., Vozdushnyi Kodeks [VOKI (Air Code] ch. 9, art. 61(2) (Russ.) (stating
that a Russian aviation company may not comprise foreign capital over forty-nine per-
cent); On the Organisation of Insurance in the Russian Federation, November 27, 1992,
Federal Law No. 4015-1 (indicating that the aggregated foreign investment in Russian
insurance companies may not exceed twenty-five percent).
433. CAA § 20(4).
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security. 4 34
Additional requirements may be imposed on certain sectors; for exam-
ple mergers in the banking sector require approval from the Reserve Bank
of India. 4 35
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry has set guidelines in Foreign
Direct Investment Policy.4 36 The guidelines cap non-Indian persons'
investment in certain Indian companies based on the goods or services
and the sector involved. 4 3 7 The Foreign Exchange Management Act also
places certain conditions on foreign investments made by Indian per-
sons.438 It is unclear how such sectoral regulation will interact with the
CAA provisions on mergers once the latter come into effect.
4. China. Several provisions under the AML prioritize non-competi-
tion concerns over MOFCOM's review of a transaction. For example,
MOFCOM has discretion not to prohibit a concentration that creates seri-
ous competition issues if proof exists that a concentration is in the public
interest. 4 39 The AML also provides that the People's Republic of China
must protect the legitimate operation of industries dominated by the
"[sitate-owned economy" and/or industries that are vital to the Chinese
national economy or national security or both.4 40
Such provisions have raised concerns that MOFCOM will take into
account non-competition issues, including industrial policy, in its review
process and that state-owned monopolies, such as railway, mail, telecom-
munications, electricity, banking, and energy industries, will be given spe-
cial treatment under the AML. 44 1 The Information Requirement Guidance
has now clarified that factors not related to competition must be discussed
in the merger filing notification.4 4 2 Moreover, the notification form
includes a section that allows "relevant parties," such as local governments,
industry authorities and the general public, to explain their opinions and a
section for predicting the concentration's social effect.44 3 The Information
Requirement Guidance also requires information to be provided if the fol-
lowing issues are relevant to the transaction: bankruptcy; national security;
industry policies; state-owned assets; famous brands; or the jurisdiction of
434. Id. § 54(c). The Central Government may also supersede the CCI for a maxi-
mum period of six months in certain circumstances, including if the government deems
it necessary in the public interest. Id. § 56(1)(c).
435. The Banking Regulation Act, No. 10 of 1949; India Code (1993), §§ 44A, 45.
436. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY, INVESTING IN INDIA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST-
MENT-POLICY & PROCEDURES (2006), available at http://dipp.nic.in/manual/FDI Manual_
textLatest.pdf.
437. See id. Annexure 1 ("Sector Specific Guidelines for Foreign Direct Investment").
438. The Foreign Exchange Management Act, No. 42 of 1999; India Code (1999), § 3.
439. AML art. 28.
440. Id. art. 7.
441. See e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATE REPORT-CHINA, supra note 402, at 32 (indicating that the AML contains "provi-
sions that have generated concern").
442. See, e.g., Information Requirement Guidance, supra note 64, art. 18.
443. See id. art. 16.
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other authorities. 4 44
Moreover, foreign investment in certain sectors continues to be subject
to heightened regulation. 445  For example, MOFCOM must conduct a
national security review of acquisitions by foreign undertakings that con-
cern national security.4 46 Discussions between China and the U.S. have
been reported, detailing the effort to seek common ground between
MOFCOM's review under the AML in China and the Committee on Foreign
Investment's review under the Exon-Florio Act 4 47 in the U.S. 4 4 8 Finally, all
foreign direct investment, whether by way of formation of a new entity or
acquisition of interests in existing domestic or foreign-invested companies,
is subject to additional approval by either MOFCOM or one of its local
branches.
449
D. Comparative Substantive Analysis
The debate concerning the merits of the "substantial lessening of com-
petition" test and the "dominant position" test generally focuses on the
U.S. and the E.U. 450 It is important to note that despite the different tests,
444. Id. art. 18.
445. See [Provisions on Guiding the Orientation of Foreign Investment, Decree
No. 346] (promulgated by the State Council of the National People's Republic of China
on April 1, 2002 and effective April 1, 2002), arts. 6, 7 (2002) (P.R.C.), available at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDIEN/Laws/law en info.jsp?docid=51267 (indicating
that foreign investment in certain sectors is, respectively, restricted or prohibited).
446. AML art. 31. The AML addresses neither the review process nor the factors that
may be considered during the review, and therefore it is unclear whether the national
security provisions of the previous merger regime survive. Under the previous merger
regime, foreign entities were required to report to MOFCOM when they acquired a con-
trolling equity interest in a domestic target that: (1) may impact on state economic
security; or (2) involves a "key industry," or possession of a well-known trademark or an
established Chinese brand. See supra note 60.
447. See Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (2000) (giving the
President the authority to consider national security effects on mergers and
acquisitions).
448. Paul Denis, Michael Hickman, & Liang Tsui, China's Anti-Monopoly Law - A New
Era, BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS, January 2009.
449. See Notice, Ministry of Commerce, Improving the Admin. Work for Examination
and Approval of Foreign Invest. Enters. in Accordance with the Law (Mar. 3, 2005);
Notice, Ministry of Commerce, Further Improving the Admin. Work for Examination
and Approval of Foreign Invest. (Mar. 5, 2009). Approval by MOFCOM itself can take
three to four months; local branches usually take about one month to issue an approval.
The transfer of shares will not be effective without prior approval. With very limited
exceptions, foreign companies may not establish branch operations and all investment
projects must be structured through onshore subsidiaries. A corporate entity with any
degree of foreign ownership is referred to in generic terms as a "foreign investment
enterprise" (FIE). Government approval of transfers of equity in a FIE is required. See
Peggy Chow & Frankie Cheung, An Update on the Opportunities for Foreign Investment in
the Distribution Center in Mainland China, METROPOLITAN COm'ORAE COUNSEL, Apr.
2009, at 45.
450. See Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) (providing that mergers are prohibited
where the effect of an acquisition "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly... "); ECMR, supra note 230; Press Release, European Comm'n,
New Merger Regulation Frequently Asked Questions (Jan. 20, 2004) (explaining that the
previous regulation was based on the concept of dominance and that the ECMR makes
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substantive conflicts are rare; examples include the near miss in the Boe-
ing/McDonnell Douglas transaction 45 1 and the GE/Honeywell transaction,
in which an actual conflict did arise.45 2
The main criticism of the dominant position test is that it does not
cover oligopolistic markets. 45 3 However, the introduction of the concept of
"collective dominance" has enabled jurisdictions to deal with situations in
which there is no one dominant firm, but rather a number of firms that are
able to coordinate their activities.4 54 Russia explicitly incorporates consid-
eration of collective dominance into its substantive merger review. 455 The
question of collective dominance is beyond the scope of this article; we do
however note that even in mature jurisdictions such as the E.U., the issue
has been difficult to address and remains unsettled.45 6 We question
whether younger regimes are equipped to address this subject while con-
temporaneously establishing their respective merger regimes.
While market definition and the subsequent assessment of market
power using share as a proxy is commonplace, it is important to recognize
that these are merely useful tools with which to begin the assessment of
whether injury to competition is likely. 45 7 It is exceedingly important to
recognize that such proxies are not substitutes for a careful and thorough
analysis of competitive effects. Nonetheless, both Brazil and Russia employ
clear that all mergers that "significantly impede effective competition" are
anticompetitive).
451. See Case IV/M.877, Boeing v. Comm'n, 1997 O.J. (L 336) 16, available at http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m877_19970730_600_en.pdf; Let-
ter from William J. Baer, Director, Federal Trade Comm'n, to Marc G. Schildkraut,
Esquire, The Boeing Co., and to Benjamin M. Sharp, Esquire, the Boeing Co. (July 1,
1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/07/boeingclose.htm.
452. See Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 331) 24,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220en.pdf
(holding that the transaction would result in a dominant position); Case T-209/01, Hon-
eywell International v. Comm'n, 2005, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:048:0026:0027:EN:PDF (dismissing Honeywell's
action for annulment of the decision); Case T-210/01, General Electric v. Comm'n,
2005, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62
001A0210:EN:HTML (dismissing General Electric's action for an annulment of the deci-
sion); see also Deborah Platt Majoras, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, U.S. Department of Justice, Remarks at State Bar of Georgia Antitrust Law Section:
GE-Honeywell: The U.S. Decision (Nov. 29, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/public/speeches/9893.pdf.
453. See, e.g., Maria Litzell, The Appraisal of Collective Dominance Under the Clarified
Substantive Test of the New EC Merger Regulation: A Step Towards Greater Global Conver-
gence of Merger Control?, 1 EUR. LAW STUDENT Ass'N SELECTED PAPERS ON EUR. LAW 32, 41
(2005) (describing the "enforcement gap" in relation to the market dominance test and
oligopolistic markets).
454. The concept of collective dominance itself is not without problems, but a
detailed discussion of the issues arising from this concept is beyond the scope of this
article.
455. See LPC art. 5(3).
456. See Litzell, supra note 453, at 34-35.
457. See ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAw: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATE~iALs 60, 404 (Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2008).
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presumptions of injury based on market shares;458 we find the use of such
presumptions to be dangerous, as they potentially encourage a less than
rigorous analysis of competitive effects.
While all the BRIC jurisdictions would appear to recognize efficiencies
either as a defense or as part of their analysis of competitive effects,45 9
certain jurisdictions also include public interest considerations. 460 We
suggest that competition enforcement agencies are poorly equipped to ana-
lyze countervailing public interest considerations in the discharge of their
competition missions. Rather, if employed, an independent body should
conduct this analysis so that the policy trade-offs, including the impact on
competition, are transparent. 4 6 1
Foreign direct investment and national security provisions are com-
mon to many jurisdictions. Here, too, it is important that these analyses
are not integrated into the competitive assessment and that transparency is
protected.46 2
VI. Remedies
A. Prohibition of Merger
Each of the BRIC regimes provides for the competition agencies to pro-
hibit a transaction or to permit a transaction to go ahead if structural and/
or behavioral remedies can eliminate the negative competitive impact of the
transaction.4 63
1. Brazil. If a transaction is found to be anticompetitive, it may be
prohibited or a partial divestment may be ordered, 4 64 targeting, for exam-
ple, brands, production facilities, and distribution networks.4 65 Tradition-
ally, CADE unilaterally imposed such remedies on the parties; however it
now appears that there is more opportunity to discuss and negotiate reme-
458. Decreto No. 50, supra note 360, para. 36; LPC arts. 5(1), 5(3); see also supra
notes 363-364 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); supra notes 379, 383 and
accompanying text (discussing Russia).
459. See supra note 414 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); supra notes
417-418 and accompanying text (discussing Russia); supra note 419 and accompanying
text (discussing India); supra note 420 and accompanying text (discussing China).
460. See e.g., supra note 422 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); supra notes
439, 440 and accompanying text (discussing China).
461. See RECOMMENDED PRAcncEs, supra note 170, at 23; see also Debra A. Valentine,
General Counsel, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks on Changes in Competition Policy and
Law at the Global Level (Dec. 13, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/
other/dvchangesincompetitionpolicy.shtm (arguing for transparency in the competition
analysis).
462. See RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, supra note 170, at 1 (stating that merger review
should focus exclusively on anticompetitive mergers and should not be used to pursue
other goals); Valentine, supra note 461 (arguing that competition laws should be trans-
parent, and that the application of non-competition criteria, including national security
interests, should be made clear).
463. See BAL art. 54(9); LPC art. 33(2); CAA §§ 31(2)-(3); AML arts. 28-29.
464. See BAL, art. 54(9).
465. See e.g., the Ambev case, supra note 373; see also supra note 6 (discussing Sky-
DirecTV).
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dies with the agency. 46 6 The remedies CADE imposes must be specific
and address the competition concerns raised by the transaction; CADE
generally prefers structural to behavioral remedies.
4 67
2. Russia. FAS may prohibit a transaction, or require a remedy to
mitigate the negative effects of a transaction found to be anticompeti-
tive, 46 8 including requiring the parties to comply with certain conditions
prior to clearance or granting clearance subject to certain conditions. 4 69
Examples of such conditions include: granting third parties industrial
property rights or access to assets or information; divesting assets or
claims to third parties; amending, or entering into, contracts; implementing
specific economic, technical, or informational measures to prevent creation
of discriminatory conditions in the market; requiring the parties to refrain
from the transfer of assets; or notifying FAS prior to taking certain
actions.4 70 As a general rule, FAS sets a deadline for compliance with its
remedy; where FAS defers clearance until compliance, the deadline must
not exceed nine months.4 71 Although FAS technically can require the
above remedies either for transactions involving a Russian company or for-
eign-to-foreign transactions, in the past it has rarely applied remedies to the
latter.4 72
3. India. Under the CAA, the CCI may approve or prohibit a transac-
tion,4 73 declare a transaction void ab initio,4 7 4 or propose modifications to
a combination to eliminate any appreciable adverse effect it may have on
competition. 4 75
4. China. If MOFCOM finds a transaction to be anticompetitive, it
has the power to block the transaction or impose remedies before clearing
the transaction.4 76 MOFCOM may impose structural remedies, behavioral
remedies, or a combination of both. 4 77 It remains unclear at which stage
466. See GLOBAL LEGAL GROUP, THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO:
MERGER CONTROL 2007 38 (2007), available at http://www.iclg.co.uk/khadmin/Publica-
tions/pdf/3242.pdf; INT'L ANTITRUST LAW COMM., AMERicAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ESSENTIALS
OF MERGER REVIEW IN BRAZIL 7 (2008).
467. See OECD COMPETITION COMM., OECD POLICY ROUNDTABLES MERGER REMEDIES
2003 94-95 (2003) (explaining the inefficiency of behavioral remedies, the low cost of
monitoring structural remedies, and the greater emphasis CADE puts on structural
remedies).
468. See LPC art. 33(2).
469. See id. art. 33(2)(3).
470. See id. art. 33(5); see also Freshfields Russia Memo, supra note 376, at 9.
471. See LPC art. 33(2)(3).
472. See GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 305.
473. See CAA §§ 31(1)-(2).
474. See id. § 6(1).
475. See id. § 31(3). It appears that it is the CCI rather than the parties that proposes
the remedies. Arguably, the parties are better placed to propose any divestment, as they
are familiar with the industry and the assets involved. This is the approach taken in the
E.U. See ECMR, supra note 230, pmbl. paras. 30, 35, art. 10.
476. See AML arts. 28-29.
477. See id. art. 29; Measures on Review of Concentrations of Undertakings, supra
note 69, art. 11 (specifying that MOFCOM may impose structural or behavioral reme-
dies, or a combination of both).
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of the review the parties may offer remedies. 47 8
Since the AML came into force, MOFCOM has required remedies with
respect to several transactions, including the InBev/Anheuser-Busch trans-
action, in which MOFCOM imposed remedies regulating the future struc-
ture of the market,4 79  the Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite International
transaction, in which MOFCOM essentially imposed a structural remedy,
albeit one with a degree of flexibility480 and the GM/Delphi transaction, in
which MOFCOM imposed a pure behavioral remedy. 48 1
B. Ancillary Restraints
The competition agencies in Brazil and Russia consider the effects of
ancillary restraints during their respective reviews. 48 2 In India and China,
there is no express provision in the legislation regarding this issue and it
remains to be seen how the CCI and MOFCOM, respectively, approach this
issue.4 83
C. Comparative Analysis of Remedies
The guiding principle of an effective antitrust remedy must be to
restore the competitive conditions that the completed transaction would
otherwise remove. 4 84 Once careful legal and economic analysis demon-
strates that a competition law violation will result from the proposed trans-
478. See AML art. 29 (not including a time line for the parties to offer remedies);
Measures on Review of Concentrations of Undertakings, supra note 69, art. 11 (stating
only that the parties may propose remedies "during the review process").
479. See supra note 12 (discussing MOFCOM's decision in InBev/Anheuser-Busch).
480. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
481. MOFCOM prohibited GM and Delphi from exchanging confidential information
relating to Delphi's other Chinese customers, and required Delphi to deal with other car
manufacturers on a non-discriminatory basis; the transaction was cleared in Phase 1. See
supra note 412; see also Rosalind Donald, China Clears GM/Delphi with Conditions,
GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., Sept. 29, 2009, available at http://www.globalcompetition
review.com/news/article/18914/china-clears-gm-delphi-conditions.
482. See BAL art. 54. In investigating a transaction, CADE routinely reviews non-
compete agreements; as a general rule, the maximum permissible period for a non-com-
pete is five years, and CADE has frequently ordered parties, including in a foreign-to-
foreign transaction, to amend agreements to comply with this rule, although CADE may
accept longer periods of time if the parties can show a justification for the extension.
Moreover, CADE will order the elimination of exclusivity agreements that it does not
deem reasonably justified. See GETrING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010
supra note 110, at 68. With regard to Russia, see LPC art. 13. To the extent that FAS has
been fully informed of arrangements related to the transaction, such arrangements gen-
erally will be covered by the clearance decision. However, in the event that such arrange-
ments themselves fall within the scope of the LPC, FAS usually will require a separate
filing. See Tatiana Kachalina & Oleg Volkov, Russia, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE
LEGAL GUIDE TO: MERGER CONTROL 2008 § 5.7 (2008), available at http://www.
liniaprava.ru/ru/file/Merger%20Control_2008-FAQTK OV-190907.pdf.
483. See generally CAA (showing no provision involving ancillary restrictions); AML
(showing no provision involving ancillary restrictions).
484. See RECOMMENDED PRACTICES, supra note 170, at 2; ICN MERGER WORKING GROUP,
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK SUBGROUP, MERGER REMEDIES REVIEW PROJECT: REPORT FOR THE
FOURTH ICN ANNUAL CONFERENCE AT BONN 1 (June 2005), http://www.internationalcom-
petitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc323.pdf.
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action, regulators must carefully analyze the remedy to ensure that it
eliminates the identified harm, no more and no less.48 5 In particular, the
remedy should be designed to protect not competitors, but rather
competition. 4
86
As a general principle, structural remedies are to be preferred; while
there may be a role for conduct remedies from time to time, they present
very substantial enforcement issues for the enforcing agency and should be
avoided unless absolutely necessary. 48 7
All the BRIC agencies employ the traditional remedies used by more
mature regimes, such as the E.U. and U.S. An observation or two is war-
ranted here.
First, there is no justification under competition law to apply a remedy
absent a finding that a transaction violates relevant antitrust law.4 88 None-
theless, the Chinese agency in the InBev/Anheuser-Busch transaction
imposed conditions on the parties, despite the fact that MOFCOM's deci-
sion expressly stated that the transaction did not give rise to competition
concerns in China. 489 Similarly, the remedies imposed in the Mitsubishi/
Lucite transaction extended to non-MMA products, albeit the decision
found that the transaction would have an anticompetitive effect only with
respect to the MMA market, and also extended to regulate organic
growth.490
Second, by imposing controls on InBev's future ability to make acqui-
sitions in China before InBev has notified or MOFCOM has analyzed any
such potential acquisitions under the AML,4 9 1 MOFCOM appears to be lay-
485. See id. ("The appropriate goal of agency intervention ... is to restore or maintain
competition affected by the merger, not to enhance premerger competition.").
486. See e.g., William J. Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Address at the
TokyoAmerica Center: The Role of Competition in Promoting Dynamic Markets and Eco-
nomic Growth (Nov. 12, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/200484.pdf.
487. See, e.g., Commission Notice on Remedies Acceptable Under Council Regulation
(EC) No 139/2004 and Under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004, 2008 O.J. (C
267) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:
267:0001:0027:EN:PDF (stating explicitly at paragraph 17 that "commitments in the
form of undertakings not to raise prices, to reduce product ranges or remove brands,
etc., will generally not eliminate competition concerns resulting from horizontal over-
laps," and stating that such remedies can only "exceptionally be accepted if their worka-
bility is fully ensured by effective implementation and monitoring ... and if they do not
risk leading to distorting effects on competition"). Similarly, the U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 17-18 (2004) [hereinafter Arrn-
TRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
205108.pdf, states that conduct remedies are to be avoided because "they tend to entan-
gle the Division and the courts in the operation of a market on an ongoing basis and
impose direct, frequently substantial, costs upon the government and public that struc-
tural remedies can avoid."
488. ANTITRUST DIVIsION POLICY GUIDE, supra note 487, at 3.
489. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (discussing MOFCOM Inbev/Anheuser-
Busch decision).
490. See MOFCOM Announcement No. 28 of 2009, supra note 259; see also supra note
408.
491. See supra note 12 (discussing MOFCOM's decision in InBev/Anheuser-Busch).
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ing down a marker as to the extent of the consolidation it is prepared to
countenance in the industry; moreover, MOFCOM is imposing a degree of
oversight in excess of that contemplated by the AML (which may in any
event have required notification of such future acquisitions). 49 2
These requirements, combined with MOFCOM's prohibition decision
in the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan transaction,4 93 have led to suggestions that
MOFCOM's approach has as much to do with industrial policy as it does
with competition assessment-a suggestion further supported by the publi-
cation of the Information Requirement Guidance, with its requirement that
information be provided to MOFCOM in the merger notification filing if,
inter alia, famous brands are relevant to the transaction.4 94 However, a
spokesperson for MOFCOM denied that its decision in the Coca-Cola!
Huiyuan transaction was based on protectionism, stating that the consider-
ation of Huiyuan as a national brand had "nothing to do with the ...
rejection" of the transaction. 49 5
VII. Sanctions
A. Failure to File
The main risk of failure to notify is that of unenforceability: each of
the BRIC competition agencies has the power either to declare the transac-
tion null and void or to order the transaction to be unraveled by requiring
divestment of the acquired assets should the transaction have an anticom-
petitive effect.
4 9 6
Each of the BRIC competition agencies also has the power to impose
fines for failure to notify.4 9 7 The fines may vary from a fixed maximum
penalty498 to a percentage of the company's turnover, 49 9 depending on the
jurisdiction. There is also the potential for loss of goodwill of the relevant
competition agency. The BRIC countries are likely to comprise an increas-
492. It should be noted that although the U.S. agencies may impose a similar notifica-
tion condition, these are generally limited to acquisition(s) made in the relevant mar-
ket(s). See, e.g., the FTC's Decision and Order in respect of BASF's acquisition of Ciba,
In re BASF SE, Corp., No. C-4253, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0810265/
090526basfdo.pdf, and DOJ's Consent Order in respect of Monsanto's acquisition of
Delta and Pine Land, U.S. v. Monsanto Company, No. 1:07-cv-00992 (D.D.C. 2008),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f239400/239476.htm.
493. See MOFCOM Announcement No. 22 of 2009, supra note 13.
494. See Information Requirement Guidance, supra note 64, art. 18; see also supra
note 444.
495. China Defends Decision to Block Coca-Cola Merger, COMPETITION LAW 360, Mar.
27, 2009, available at http://www.law360.com/articles/94197.
496. See supra note 464 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); supra note 468
and accompanying text (discussing Russia); supra notes 474-475 and accompanying
text (discussing India); supra notes 476-477 and accompanying text (discussing China).
497. See infra notes 502-503 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); infra note
508 and accompanying text (discussing Russia); infra note 514 and accompanying text
(discussing India); infra note 517 and accompanying text (discussing China).
498. See e.g., infra note 508 and accompanying text (discussing Russia); infra note
517 and accompanying text (discussing China).
499. See e.g., infra note 514 and accompanying text (discussing India).
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ing part of the global economy, 500 and it is likely that companies will wish
to make additional future acquisitions in these jurisdictions. Indeed, com-
petition agencies worldwide commonly discover failures to file upon notifi-
cation of a subsequent transaction. 5°1
1. Brazil. Failure to file by the deadline will result in fines calculated
on the basis of the following formula: (i) a starting minimum fine of
approximately BRL 60,000 (approx. USD 30,000); to which (ii) a daily fine
of BRL 600 (approx. USD 300) is added; to which (iii) where the parties'
average group revenues in Brazil exceed BRL 400 million (approx. USD 200
million), 0.005% of the aggregated turnover is added. 50 2 A minimum and
maximum penalty of BRL 60,000 (approx. USD 30,000) to BRL 6 million
(approx. USD 3 million) applies, 50 3 which may be increased by aggravating
factors such as the length of the delay, the turnover of the parties, the
anticompetitive effects of the transaction, and repeat-offender parties. 50 4
The resolution also establishes a 30% reduction of the fine if the parties
voluntarily bring the late notification to the agency's attention. 50 5
The agencies generally enforce the filing requirements rigorously and
failures to file that CADE subsequently discovers are nearly always
fined. 50 6 No distinction is made between the parties to the transaction,
and thus the obligation to file is on all parties; 50 7 nonetheless, although
the parties are jointly and severally liable, CADE will generally pursue the
party from which it is most likely to obtain payment.
2. Russia. For failure to file a pre- or post-merger notification, FAS
may impose fines of twenty to fifty times a corporate officer's base salary,
and may also fine the corporation in the amount of 500 to 5,000 times
annual earnings. 508
Fines for failure to file are imposed regularly, but the risk of a fine is
much lower if consummation of the transaction occurs after filing, even if
the parties have not yet obtained clearance; 50 9 even after expiration of the
500. GRANT THORNTON INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS REPORT 2007: EMERG-
ING MARKETS 2 (2007), available at http://wwwinternationalbusinessreport.com/files/
internationalbusiness-report_2007_emerging-markets.pdf ("By 2050, the BRIC econo-
mies will account for 44% of global GDP").
501. See Jack E. Pace III, Roundtable Discussion: Counseling on Complex Issues, ANTi-
TRUST, Spring 2008, at 7, 23 (Vanessa Turner commenting).
502. See BAL arts. 54, 67; Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econ6mica Resolu Ao
No. 44/07 de 14 de fevereiro de 2007 [hereinafter CADE Resolution No. 44/071, art.
1(1II), available at http://www.cade.gov.br/Default.aspx?2aOaOal6laf83blf3415.
503. BAL, art. 54(5); CADE Resolution No. 44/07, supra note 502, art. 3.
504. CADE Resolution No. 44/07, supra note 502, arts. 1(IV)-(V).
505. See id. art. 2.
506. See Michael G. Cowie & Cesar Costa Alves de Mattos, Antitrust Review of Merg-
ers, Acquisitions, and Joint Ventures in Brazil, 67 ANTTRUST L. J. 113, 127 (1999).
507. See generally BAL (failing to impose the filing obligation on a specific party to
the transaction).
508. See Code of Administrative Violations, supra note 333, art. 19.8.
509. In April 2009, FAS imposed administrative fines on Vertoletnaya Servisnaya
Kompania (helicopter services) and Voenno-Promyshlennaya Kompania (a military-
industrial company) for closing a transaction without prior approval. See Ivolgina &
Manninen, supra note 40.
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statutory waiting periods, the parties technically are prohibited from con-
summating the transaction until obtaining clearance from FAS. 5 10
The LPC Amendment clarified that for an acquisition of shares, assets
or rights, the acquirer is under the legal obligation to file. 5 11 Otherwise,
the LPC does not currently define which of the parties to the transaction is
responsible for the pre-merger filing; instead, any party interested in the
transaction (i.e., the acquirer, the seller, or even the target) can file.5 12
3. India. The obligation to notify is on both parties in the case of a
merger and on the acquirer in the case of an acquisition, including an
acquisition of control.5 13 A finding by the CCI of a failure to notify or a
late filing attracts a penalty of 1% of either the turnover or the assets
(whichever is higher) of the offending combination. 51 4 It is currently
unclear whether the correct measure is the violator's Indian or worldwide
turnover or assets;5 15 which measure is used will have potentially signifi-
cant implications for the level of any fine. In the case of imposing a fine for
late filing of an acquisition, the draft Merger Regulations provide that the
calculation of the thirty day deadline to file starts from execution of the
definitive purchase agreement.5 16
4. China. Under the AML, a failure to notify may result in a fine of
up to RMB 500,000 (approx. USD 73,000). 5 17 In the case of a merger, the
parties must jointly file the notification, 518 although as a matter of prac-
tice, the acquirer generally submits the filing. In the case of an acquisition
of control or the ability to impose decisive influence over an undertaking,
the acquirer must submit the filing. 5 19 If the party responsible for filing
fails to submit the merger notification, any other party may do so.
520
B. Implementation Before Clearance
In both non-suspensory and suspensory jurisdictions, the competition
agency may impose a remedy to rectify the substantive anticompetitive
impact of a transaction that is consummated prior to receiving clear-
ance. 52 1 In non-suspensory jurisdictions such as Brazil, there is no obliga-
tion not to consummate prior to obtaining clearance, and therefore the
510. See LPC arts. 27(1), 28(1), 29(1) (stating that the relevant transactions can be
performed or conducted only with FAS' prior consent); see also id. art. 34 (imposing
remedy where FAS' prior consent is not obtained).
511. LPC art. 32(1)(3).
512. See LPC art. 32(1).
513. CAA § 6(2); Competition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft of (Combina-
tion) Regulations (200), reg. 10.
514. CAA § 43A.
515. See id.
516. Competition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft of (Combination) Regula-
tions (200), reg. 6(2)(a).
517.. AML art. 48.
518. Measures on Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings, supra note 68, art.
9.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. See REcOMMENDED PRACTCES, supra note 170.
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competition agency will not impose sanctions for doing so. 5 22 However, in
suspensory jurisdictions, the competition agency will impose a penalty for
taking such action.5 23
1. Brazil. Although there is no obligation not to consummate prior
to receiving clearance, CADE may order remedies in the event that it subse-
quently determines that the transaction is in violation of the competition
laws.5 2 4 As discussed above, after it found that the transaction would
harm competition, CADE ordered Votorantim to divest the cement plants it
had acquired from Holcim. 5 25 Similarly, in October 2004, CADE ordered
Nestle to unwind its acquisition of Garoto. 5 26
2. Russia. The court may annul transactions carried out in breach
of the notification requirements if such transactions have led or may lead
to the restriction of competition. 52 7 This standard incorporates the sub-
stantive test.52 8 Although fines may be imposed for consummating the
transaction without the receipt of clearance by FAS, 529 to date it appears
that the court has yet to impose a fine on a transaction that closed after the
filing but prior to obtaining clearance. In theory, there is a risk that FAS
could impose the same fine as for closing without filing by analogy.
3. India. Consummation of the transaction prior to receipt of clear-
ance may result in a fine of up to 1% of the total turnover or assets of the
combination, whichever is higher. 530 As discussed above, it is unclear
whether the correct measure is Indian or worldwide turnover or assets. 53 1
4. China. Consummation of the transaction prior to expiration of
the waiting period may result in fines of up to RMB 500,000 (approx. USD
73,000).532
C. Comparative Analysis of Sanctions
The purpose behind sanctions in this context is to deter violation. 53 3
Thus, the question is whether the sanction is sufficient to achieve this aim.
522. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. If the parties close a transaction
despite an injunction prohibiting them from doing so, civil law penalties will apply. BAL
art. 62.
523. See infra notes 527-532 and accompanying text.
524. BAL art. 54(9).
525. CADE Requires Cement Divestitures, GLOBAL COMPETITION REv., Mar. 25,
2008, available at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/10158/cade-
requires-cement-divestitures.
526. CADE Sticks with Nestle Decision, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., Oct. 15, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/4889/cade-sticks-nestl-
eacute-decision. CADE ordered the unwinding of the acquisition, although the compa-
nies were already integrated, and despite an offer by Nestle to divest other brands and
thus reduce its market share from 56% to 38%. Id.
527. LPC art. 34.
528. See id. arts. 33(2), 34; see also supra note 374 and accompanying text.
529. See Tapani Manninen, et. al., supra note 178.
530. CAA § 43A.
531. See id.; see also supra note 515 and accompanying text.
532. AML art. 48.
533. See Harald Kahlenberg & Janine Weinhold, European Commission Imposes C20
Million Fine for Failure to File Transaction, Aug. 27 2009, available at http://
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Each of the BRIC regimes imposes a fine on the parties for failure to
file.5 34 In this respect, the sanctions imposed by the U.S. and E.U., respec-
tively, are instructive. In both jurisdictions, a fine is imposed for each day
that the company is in violation of the relevant legislation, 53 5 thus rapidly
escalating the costs of non-compliance and providing an ongoing incentive
for the company in breach to comply as quickly as possible. The sanctions
imposed by the BRIC regimes are much less severe 536 and whether they
will act as a sufficient deterrent remains to be seen.
The severity of the sanction imposed for consummating a transaction
prior to receipt of clearance, together with the availability of a hold-sepa-
rate, will obviously influence whether parties decide to wait for clear-
ance.5 3 7 Only India and China impose sanctions on parties that
consummate the transaction prior to receipt of clearance from the competi-
tion agency. 53 8 Nonetheless, in practice the Brazilian agencies will obtain
an injunction preventing the parties from closing, a breach of which will
result in civil penalties. 539 Russia therefore remains the sole jurisdiction in
which it is unclear whether the competition agency will impose a sanction
for closing after submission of a filing, but prior to clearance.
5 40
VIII. Third Party Involvement
A. Confidentiality and Cooperation with Other Jurisdictions
A balance must be struck between allowing companies to restrict the
public dissemination of their confidential information and providing the
competition agency (and third parties) with sufficient information to
enable the agency to make its determination (and third parties to make
relevant submissions). Most competition agencies require that companies
www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=950e1059-06da-4759-aae4-
2742cf79acaf&redir=1.
534. See supra notes 502-520 and accompanying text.
535. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g)(1); ECMR arts. 8(5), (15). In the U.S., failure to comply
with the HSR Act, including the obligation not to consummate the transaction until expi-
ration of the applicable waiting period, is punishable by a civil fine of up to USD 16,000
per day; moreover, those in violation are also subject to injunctive or other equitable
relief. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g)(1). Although the language provides that the fine shall be USD
10,000, the Debt Collection Improvement Act 1996 requires the FTC to index the fine to
inflation. The fine was set at USD 16,000 per day in 2009. See Federal Penalties Infla-
tion Adjustment Act 1990, as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement Act 1996,
65 Fed. Reg. 69,665 (FTC Nov. 20, 2000 (final rule amendments)); see also 74 Fed. Reg.
857 (Jan. 9, 2009), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/pdf/E9-210.pdf.
Similarly, in the E.U., the competition agency may fine a company up to 10% of its
aggregate worldwide annual turnover, and up to 5% of the aggregate daily turnover of
the companies involved for each working day of the infringement. See ECMR, supra note
230, arts. 8(5), (15).
536. See supra notes 502-520 and accompanying text (discussing sanctions for failure
to file).
537. See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L.
REv. 652, 653-61 (1983) (outlining model for optimal antitrust penalties).
538. See supra notes 530-532 and accompanying text.
539. See supra notes 524-526 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 527-529 and accompanying text.
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provide them with all requested information, including business secrets. 541
However, competition agencies are generally sympathetic to the need to
safeguard the parties' confidential information from general publica-
tion,542 and the BRIC regimes are no exception. The parties in Brazil,
India and China are generally permitted to provide the agency with a non-
confidential version of the submitted information, which third parties may
then access. 543
Competition agencies reviewing the same deal in different jurisdic-
tions will often informally or formally contact each other.544 The extent to
which competition agencies cooperate with each other or are influenced by
each other's conduct on individual cases is increasing. 545 Cooperation can
be through the framework of formal bilateral cooperation agreements, mul-
tilateral recommendations and meetings, or more informal contacts. 546
1. Brazil. At the time of filing, the type of transaction, the parties,
and the affected industry are published by the SDE. Later in the review,
rulings on requests for confidential treatment are also published (stating
whether or not they were granted). Finally, a summary of the opinion
issued by SDE is published, while the non-confidential versions of the
SEAE and SDE opinions are also made available on their respective web-
sites.547 CADE's final decision is also publicly available, with the confi-
dential information redacted. 548
Third parties can request access to the file;549 but the agencies gener-
ally respect requests for confidential treatment of sensitive information
541. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST COOPERATION
HANDBOOK, 79, 91, 106, 118, 129-30, 146-47, 162-63, 173-74, 187, 200, 211, 224,
237, 245-46, 257-58, 268, 280-81 (2004) (outlining information sharing policies of
the competition agencies of, respectively, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the
E.U., France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, Spain,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom).
542. See id. (outlining the protections afforded to confidential information by the
competition agencies of the same countries).
543. See infra notes 547-550 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); infra notes
571-572 and accompanying text (discussing India); infra notes 576-577 and accompa-
nying text (discussing China).
544. See INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST COOPERATION HANDBOOK, supra note 541, at 3-5.
545. Deborah Platt Majoras, Convergence Conflict and Comity: The Search for Coher-
ence in International Competition Policy, 2007 FoRD, m COMP. L. INST. 5 (B. Hawk. Ed.
2008).
546. See INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST COOPERATION HANDBOOK, supra note 541, at 3-5.
547. See BAL arts. 14(V), (XV) (requiring the SDE to have due regard for the confiden-
tiality of information that it requests and to make public violations of the BAL and any
remedies imposed); see also Portaria No. 04/2006, de 5 de janeiro de 2006, D.O.U. de
06.01.2006, available at http://www.cade.gov.br/upload/2006portariaMJ04.pdf (regu-
lating the protection of confidential information by SDE); Portaria No. 46/2006, de 28
de marco de 2006, available at http://www.seae.fazenda.gov.br/central-documentos/
legislacao/3-5-1-defesa-da-concorrencia/portaria-seae-no-46 (regulating the protection
of confidential information by SEAE).
548. See BAL art. 7(IX), (XVIII) (requiring CADE to have due regard for the confidenti-
ality of information that it requests and to make public violations of the BAL); see also
CADE Resolution No. 45/2007, supra note 95 (regulating the protection of confidential
information by CADE).
549. GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 69.
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within the file.550 Third parties may also present submissions to the agen-
cies and request meetings with officials throughout the review process. 55 1
Moreover, the agencies will often send customers and competitors informa-
tion requests and ask for their opinion of the transaction. 55 2 As discussed
above, interested third parties may request that CADE issue a preliminary
injunction to prevent the transaction closing.55 3
Brazil has antitrust cooperation agreements with several other jurisdic-
tions, including Canada,55 4 Russia,555 and the U.S.,55 6 each of which per-
mits the exchange of non-confidential information; confidential
information will not be shared unless the parties expressly authorize such
disclosure.
2. Russia. FAS is under an obligation not to disclose commercial or
other legally protected secrets. 55 7 FAS officials bear civil, administrative or
criminal liability for unauthorized disclosures, and any damage caused by
such a disclosure must be compensated by the federal state. 5 58 Officers of
FAS have indicated that even with respect to information in filings that is
not designated as sensitive, FAS remains under an obligation to maintain
its confidential status and should not disclose the information except as
discussed below.5 5 9
Under the LPC, FAS must publish on its website information on a
transaction subject to a Phase 2 review, and any interested party has the
right to comment on the potential impact of the transaction on the compet-
550. See id.
551. See id.
552. Id.
553. See also supra note 96 and accompanying text.
554. Cooperation Arrangement Between the Commissioner of Competition, Competi-
tion Bureau of the Government of Canada, and the Council for Economic Defense, the
Secretariat of Economic Law of the Ministry of Justice, and the Secretariat for Economic
Monitoring of the Ministry of Finance of the Government of the Federal Republic of
Brazil Regarding the Application of their Competition Laws, Braz.-Can., Apr. 25, 2008,
available at http://competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Brazil%20Coop
%20-%20final%20text%20-%2025Apr083.pdf/$FILE/Brazil%2OCoop%20-%20final%
20text%20-%2025Apr083.pdf.
555. Agreement on Cooperation in the Sphere of Competition Policy Between the
Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Federative Republic
of Brazil, Russ.-Braz., Dec. 2001, available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrna-
tional/agreements/1568.shtml; Programme on Co-operation Between FAS Russia and
Council for Economic Defense, Secretariat of Economic Law of Ministry of Justice of
Federal Republic of Brazil and Secretariat of Economic Monitoring of Ministry of
Finance for 2006-2007, Russ.-Braz., Dec. 31, 2007, available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/
english/inetrnational/agreements/8580.shtml.
556. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil Regarding Cooperation Between their
Competition Authorities in the Enforcement of their Competition Laws, U.S.-Braz., Oct.
26, 1999, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/10/BrazilUStreaty.htm.
557. See LPC art. 26(1).
558. See id. arts. 26(2)-(3).
559. See infra note 560 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, there has been at least
one incident in which a FAS case-handler commented on a transaction in an interview
with a newspaper. The transaction had been notified to FAS in a filing not designated as
confidential.
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itive environment. 5 60 Therefore, third parties are likely to start becoming
more involved in the merger review process as more information on filings
enters the public domain.
FAS cooperates with a number of antitrust agencies in other jurisdic-
tions,5 6 1 including those of the former Eastern Europe (e.g., Czech Repub-
lic, 5 6 2 Hungary,5 63 Poland,56 4 Romania5 6 5), certain E.U. states (e.g.,
Finland,5 6 6 Italy,5 67 Sweden 5 68 ), and Asian states (e.g., China5 6 9 and
560. See LPC art. 33(3). In the case of an intra-person transfer, FAS publishes on its
website the list of group entities submitted by the parties in order to obtain an exemp-
tion from the pre-notification obligation. See LPC art. 31(2)(1).
561. See OECD, PEER REVIEW OF RussIA's COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY: THE ROLE OF
COMPETITION POLICY IN REGULATORY REFORM 32 (Jan. 21, 2004), available at http://
www.fas.gov.ru/english/international/oecd/1571 .shtml.
562. Memorandum on the Cooperation Between the Federal Antimonopoly Service of
the Russian Federation and the Office for the Protection of Competition of the Czech
Republic, Russ.-Czech. Rep., May 31, 2007, available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/
inetrnational/agreements/20968.shtml.
563. Memorandum on the Co-operation Between the State Antimonopoly Committee
of Russian Federation and the Office of Economic Competition of the Republic of Hun-
gary, Russ.-Hung., Aug. 29, 1997, available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrna-
tional/agreements/1574.shtml.
564. Programme on Co-operation Between the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the
Russian Federation and the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection of the
Republic of Poland for 2006-2007, Russ.-Pol., Jan. 19, 2006, available at http://
www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrnational/agreements/8591.shtml; Programme on Co-oper-
ation Between the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation and the
Office of Competition and Consumer Protection of the Republic of Poland for
2008-2010, Russ.-Pol., Dec. 10, 2007, available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/
inetrnational/agreements/20965 .shtml.
565. Memorandum on Cooperation Between the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the
Russian Federation and the Romanian Competition Council, Russ.-Rom., Oct. 22, 2008,
available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrnational/agreements/20951.shtml.
566. Programme on Cooperation Between the Federal Antimonopoly Service of the
Russian Federation and the Finnish Competition Authority for 2008-2009, Russ.-Fin.,
Oct. 17, 2007, available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrnational/agreements/
20966.shtml; Programme on Cooperation Between the Federal Antimonopoly Service of
the Russian Federation and the Finnish Competition Authority for 2006-2007, Russ.-
Fin., Feb. 8, 2006, available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrnational/agreements/
4817.shtml.
567. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Antimonopoly Service
(Russian Federation) and the Italian Competition Authority, Russ.-Italy, Sept. 19, 2008,
available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrnational/agreements/20964.shtml.
568. Memorandum on Understanding Between the Federal Antimonopoly Service
(Russian Federation) and the Swedish Competition Authority for the Years 2009-2010,
Russ.-Swed., Dec. 15, 2008, available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrnational/
agreements/21530.shtml; Memorandum on Understanding Between Federal Antimono-
poly Service (Russian Federation) and Swedish Competition Authority for the Years
2007-2008, Russ.-Swed., available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrnational/
agreements/20963.shtml; Memorandum on Mutual Understanding Between the Federal
Antimonopoly Service of the Russian Federation and the Swedish Competition Author-
ity, Russ.-Swed., Dec. 4, 2004, available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrnational/
agreements/8579.shtml.
569. Memorandum of Understanding Between FAS Russia and SAIC China for Imple-
mentation of the Agreement Between the Government of Russia and Government of
China on Cooperation in the Fields of Countering Unfair Competition and Antimono-
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Korea 570 ).
3. India. If the CCI is prima facie of the opinion that a transaction is
likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition, it will require
the parties to publish details of the transaction in order to bring the trans-
action to the attention of the public and third parties likely to be affected
by it.57 1 The parties may provide to the CCI a non-confidential version for
publication.5 72 Moreover, the CCI may invite comments from particular
third parties.5 73
The agencies of other jurisdictions were extensively involved in the
drafting and consultation of the CAA and the draft Merger Regulations; 574
such consultation and cooperation are likely to continue once the CAA is
fully implemented.5 75
4. China. Under the AML, MOFCOM is required to publish its deci-
sion only if it prohibits a transaction or imposes remedies on the parties
involved.5 76 Thus, MOFCOM is not required to publish pre-merger notifi-
cations or clearance decisions.5 77
At least in relation to transactions in which a remedy is required, cus-
tomers and competitors are invited to attend meetings with MOFCOM
under the AML merger regime.5 78
poly Policy in 2006-2007, Russ.-P.R.C., Nov. 3, 2005, available at http://www.fas.
gov.ru/english/inetrnational/agreements/8582.shtml.
570. Memorandum on Co-operation Between the Ministry of the Russian Federation
for Antimonopoly Policy and Support to Entrepreneurship and the Fair Trade Commis-
sion of the Republic of Korea, Russ.-S. Korea, Dec. 7, 1999, available at http://
www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrnational/agreements/1573.shtml.
571. See CAA § 29(2).
572. Competition Comm'n of India [CCI], Proposed Draft of (Combination) Regula-
tions (200.), reg. 55; Competition Comm'n of India [CCI] (General) Regulations, 2009
(No. 2 of 2009), May 21, 2009, art. 35, available at http://www.cci.gov.in/images/
media/Regulations/general.pdf?phpMyAdmin=NMPFRahGKYeum5F74Ppstn7RfOO.
573. See CAA § 29(3).
574. See, e.g., Submission Regarding the Proposed Indian Mandatory Merger Notifica-
tion Regime from the Antitrust Working Group of the International Bar Association,
February 13, 2007, available at http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Antitrust Trade LawSec-
tion/Antitrust/Antitrust WkGp-lndianComp.aspx; JOINT COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION'S SECS. OF ANTITRUST, BUSINESS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ON PROPOSED
DRAFT OF THE COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA (COMBINATION) REGULATIONS (March
2008) [hereinafter ABA JOINT COMMENTS ON INDIA'S PROPOSED MERGER REGULATIONS],
available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2008/03-08/comments-
india.pdf; JOINT COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S SECTIONS OF ANTITRUST
LAW, BUSINESS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ON IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS FOR AND AMEND-
MENTS TO THE MERGER CONTROL PROVISIONS OF INDIA'S COMPETITION (AMENDMENT) ACT
2007 (November 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/
2007/11-07/Comments-IndianCompetition.pdf.
575. See, e.g., India's participation in the ICN, infra note 615 and accompanying text.
576. See AML art. 30.
577. See id.
578. See Measures on the Review of Concentration of Undertakings, supra note 69.
MOFCOM may request information and documentation from government agencies, cus-
tomers, suppliers, competitors and consumers. Id. art. 6. Moreover, MOFCOM may
require a hearing, either on its own initiative or at the request of third parties, to which it
may invite competitors, relevant experts, industry associations, and government agen-
cies. Id. art. 7. It is unclear whether such hearings will be open to the public. During
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There is no formal cooperation mechanism between MOFCOM and
the competition agencies of other regimes.5 79 However, during the draft-
ing of the AML, there was extensive consultation between MOFCOM and
other competition agencies in mature jurisdictions, including the E.U.,
Japan and the U.S.580 This cooperation, or at least consultation, is likely
to continue. 58 '
B. Comparative Analysis of Confidentiality and International
Cooperation
In each of the BRIC regimes provision exists for the publication of
information on the transaction but the degree of transparency greatly var-
ies. At one end of the spectrum, Brazil publishes details of every filing
regardless of whether substantive concerns arise as a result of the transac-
tion; 582 at the other end of the spectrum, China publishes the decision
only if remedies are imposed on the transaction or the transaction is pro-
hibited. 58 3 Russia and India have found the middle ground, publishing
details of the transaction only if the transaction requires a Phase 2 investi-
gation.58 4 This mid-spectrum approach should enable third parties to par-
ticipate constructively in the review process and also protect confidential
information and avoid incurring the additional cost of creating non-confi-
dential versions of documentation where no substantive issue arises.
its investigation of the InBev/Anheuser-Busch transaction, and after receipt of the filing,
together with all supporting documentation from the parties, MOFCOM held several
seminars, symposia, and public hearings to hear opinions and suggestions from third
parties, including industry associations, local governments, and competitors. See supra
note 12.
579. See generally AML.
580. See, e.g., JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S SECTIONS OF ANTI-
TRUST AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE ON THE PROPOSED ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (July 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/anti-
trust/at-comments/2003/07-03/ointsubmission.pdf; JOINT SUBMISSION OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION'S SECTIONS OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW ON THE PROPOSED ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(May 2005) [hereinafter ABA JOINT SUBMISSION ON CHINA'S PROPOSED ANTI-MONOPOLY
LAw], available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2005/05-05/com-
mentsprc2005wapp.pdf; JOINT COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAw AND SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON DRAFT FOR COMMENTS OF THE
STATE COUNCIL REGULATIONS ON NOTIFICATIONS OF CONCENTRATIONS OF UNDERTAKINGS
(April 2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2008/04-08/
comments-undertakingdraft.pdf; COMMENTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAW AND SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAw ON THE GUIDELINES ON ANTITRUST
FILINGS FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS OF DOMESTIC ENTERPRISES BY FOREIGN INVESTORS
(March 2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2007/03-07/
comm-PRC.pdf.
581. See e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2010 NATIONAL TRADE ESTI-
MATE REPORT-CHINA, supra note 402, at 32 (indicating that the relevant agencies in
China have been willing to seek public comment on proposed implementing measures).
582. See supra notes 547-548 and accompanying text.
583. AML art. 30; see also supra note 576 and accompanying text.
584. LPC art. 33(3); CAA § 29(2); see also supra notes 560 and accompanying text
(discussing Russia); supra note 571 and accompanying text (discussing India).
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The agencies of each of the BRIC jurisdictions can and do contact the
parties' customers during their investigations regarding whether the trans-
action is likely to harm competition. 58 5 Customers obviously have an
interest in communicating to the agencies if a transaction is likely to result
in higher prices, and obtaining the perspective of the customers can be an
efficient short-cut for the agencies. Nonetheless, agencies should objec-
tively assess negative responses from customers because complaining cus-
tomers may have ulterior motives for giving such responses (e.g., a supplier
may have raised prices recently for reasons unrelated to the transaction at
hand).
Russia is the only BRIC regime to impose criminal sanctions on an
individual who is responsible for publication of a party's confidential infor-
mation.58 6 A discussion of the merits of holding administrative employees
criminally responsible for acts taken in the course of their duties is beyond
the scope of this article, but suffice it to say that neither the U.S. nor the
E.U. imposes similar sanctions.5 8 7
Both Brazil and Russia have concluded a number of antitrust coopera-
tion agreements with a variety of other jurisdictions, 58 8 although India and
China, which are newer regimes, have yet to do so. Moreover, it appears
that there may be a growing trend toward cooperation and consultation
between the antitrust agencies of the BRIC jurisdictions themselves. 58 9
IX. Judicial Review
A. Opportunities for Appeal
Of the BRIC jurisdictions, only India has a specialist competition law
court. 590 In China and Brazil, the initial appeal is to the administrative
body that makes the initial decision, although there is provision for an
appeal to the court thereafter. 59 1 In Russia, it is possible to appeal directly
to the court.59
2
1. Brazil. Administrative appeals against CADE's decisions are sub-
mitted to the original panel of Commissioners and are rarely successful
unless new evidence is presented. 5 93 The parties may petition for judicial
585. See e.g., supra note 552 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); supra note
578 and accompanying text (discussing China).
586. See LPC art. 26(2); see also supra note 558 and accompanying text.
587. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a(g)(1); see generally ECMR, supra note 230.
588. See supra notes 554-556 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); supra notes
561-570 and accompanying text (discussing Russia).
589. See, e.g., Joint Communique of the Meeting of the Heads of Competition Authori-
ties of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Russian Federation, the Republic of India,
and the People's Republic of China, BRIC International Competition Conference (Sept.
1, 2009), available at http://www.fas.gov.ru/english/inetrnational/agreements/26924.
shtml.
590. See CAA § 53A.
591. See AML art. 53; GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note
110, at 69.
592. See LPC art. 52.
593. See GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110, at 69.
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review of a CADE decision; grounds for review include new evidence not
originally presented to the agency, evidence of procedural error, and evi-
dence of the decision imposing unreasonable costs on the parties.
5 94
Although the judicial process may take several years to produce a final
outcome if challenged up to the Supreme Court, the parties will initially
seek an injunction to suspend the effects of CADE's decision;5 9 5 if unsuc-
cessful, they likely will not proceed with the action.
2. Russia. FAS' decisions may be challenged in court in a civil law
procedure within three months of issuance. 596 The failure of FAS to issue a
decision within the requisite time period may also be challenged.
Each of the first three stages of the judicial review process (i.e., trial
court, court of first appeal, and court of second appeal) takes approxi-
mately two months. A review by the Russian Supreme Court (which is
highly unlikely) could take up to six months.
Significant delays in service can arise if one party to the proceedings is
a non-Russian entity; if a party to the proceedings is incorporated in a
jurisdiction that is party to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extra-judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters
(1965), 5 9 7 the requirements for service may result in delays of up to six
months at each level of review.
3. India. The Competition Appellate Tribunal (CAT), which is a
three member quasi-judicial body, has jurisdiction to hear appeals against
the directions and orders of the CCI.598 Under the CAA, a party may
appeal to the CAT against a decision within sixty days of communication of
the decision or order of the CCI.5 99 Appeals from the CAT are heard by the
Supreme Court of India and must be filed within sixty days of the order of
the CAT. 60 0
4. China. In the first instance, parties must appeal to MOFCOM for
"administrative reconsideration" within sixty days of becoming aware of
MOFCOM's decision; this process will take sixty days, with a possible
extension of thirty days in complex cases. 60 1 If not satisfied by the out-
come of this procedure, the parties must bring an action to challenge
MOFCOM's decision in a People's Court within fifteen days of the receipt
594. See Bruna, de Queiroz & Pinheiro da Silveira, supra note 314.
595. See GETTING THE DEAI. THROUGH: MERGER CONTROL 2010, supra note 110,
at 69-70.
596. LPC art. 52.
597. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, November
18, 1965, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=17.
598. See CAA § 53A.
599. Id. § 53B(2).
600. Id. § 53T.
601. AML art. 53; see also Administrative Reconsideration Law (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), arts. 9, 31
(1999), available at http://en.lg.gov.cn/en-web/ArticlePrint.aspx?artld=22755.
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of MOFCOM's decision; this process may take up to two months. 60 2
B. Comparative Analysis of Judicial Review
It is an oft-cited maxim that "it is not merely of some importance but
is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."60 3 It is not imme-
diately apparent that an appeal, as in Brazil and China, to the same mem-
bers of the same body that issued the initial decision60 4 fulfills this
requirement. Nonetheless, this is an issue that also arises in some mature
regimes 605 and both Brazil and China do provide for eventual judicial
oversight. 606
As a general matter, judicial review by a specialist court is preferable,
as it allows the members of the judiciary to develop their expertise in an
area of law that they might otherwise encounter only infrequently. 60 7 This
will potentially act to improve the quality of the judgments handed down,
thus adding valuable precedent to the jurisprudence of the jurisdiction.608
Of the BRIC regimes, only India has such a specialist court.60 9
X. Other
A. International Cooperation
International cooperation and communication between competition
agencies are to be encouraged because they facilitate the exchange of
knowledge and policy considerations, thus increasing the likelihood of
convergence between the merger regimes of different jurisdictions. 6 10
Convergence is important because it increases efficiency, reducing both
the parties' costs of compliance and the risk of an unwitting violation of
the law.6 1
1
It is therefore encouraging that, in addition to the specific bilateral
602. Administrative Procedure Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l Peo-
ple's Cong., April 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), arts. 58 and 60 (1990), available at
http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/aplotproc536.
603. R v. Sussex, Ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256 at 259.
604. See supra note 593 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); supra note 601
(discussing China).
605. For example, in the U.S., the Federal Trade Commission litigates the antitrust
cases it elects to prosecute before its own administrative law judges and will hear any
subsequent appeal itself.
606. See supra note 594 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); supra note 602
(discussing China).
607. Edward Cazalet, Specialised Courts: Are They a 'Quick Fix' or a Long-Term
Improvement in the Quality of Justice?, March 5, 2001, http://siteresources.worldbank.
org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/SpecializedCourtsCazadet.pdf.
608. Id.
609. See supra note 590 and accompanying text.
610. See e.g., BRIC International Competition Conference, Conference and Its Tasks,
http://www.bric-competition.com/page.php?id=9.
611. See Galloway, supra note 167, at 183 (discussing the costs associated with multi-
ple merger notifications and convergence).
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agreements concluded by certain of the BRIC jurisdictions, 6 12 the BRIC
regimes appear willing to actively participate in international fora to
exchange ideas and policy considerations. For example, representatives
from Brazil, Russia, and China attended the OECD Eighth Global Forum
on Competition, which took place in February 2009 in France.6 13 Repre-
sentatives from each of the BRIC jurisdictions attended the twelfth session
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which took
place in Ghana in April 2008.614
Moreover, Brazil, Russia, and India are members of the ICN.6 15
Although there were reports in 2008 that China would join the ICN before
April 2009,616 these predictions have yet to materialize. The ICN is an
association of almost 100 competition agencies which encourages input
from the private sector. It meets annually to develop best practices in com-
petition regulation and is intended to provide a forum for countries at all
stages of development to discuss practical competition enforcement and
policy issues. 6 1 7
Conclusion
Notwithstanding the recent economic downturn, the BRIC economies
will continue to increase in relative importance. Whether competition pol-
icy will play a significant role in that development remains to be seen. In
this article we have sought to review both the substantive and procedural
aspects of the four regimes. While there are, as is to be expected, differ-
ences between the competition law regimes in these jurisdictions, both in
terms of the legislation passed and the institutional models employed, effi-
ciency is asserted to be the underlying predicate for each. This is good, but
how will this play out in reality?
Writing a conclusion at this juncture seems premature. India's legisla-
tion has yet to be fully implemented,6 18 and Brazil is contemplating an
extensive overhaul of its current regime. 6 19 Nonetheless, all four jurisdic-
tions face similar challenges. Corruption, for example, is no stranger to
612. See supra notes 554-556 and accompanying text (discussing Brazil); supra notes
561-570 and accompanying text (discussing Russia).
613. See OECD, Eighth Global Forum on Competition, 19-20 February 2009, Paris
(France), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3343,en_40382599_403931
05_.41512929 1 1 I l,00.html; see also OECD, Seventh Global Forum on Competition,
21-22 February 2008, Paris (France) (at which Russia, India and China made submis-
sions), available at http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,?en_40382599_?403931
05_40442550 1 1 l,00.html.
614. See United Nations, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: List
of Participants, U.N. Doc. TD/INF.41 (May 23, 2008), available at http://
www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdinf4 len.pdf.
615. See ICN, Members, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/members/
member-directory.aspx.
616. China to Join Antitrust Network: U.K. Official, COMPETITION LAW 360, April 14,
2008, available at http://www.law360.com/articles/52987.
617. ICN, About, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about.aspx.
618. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
619. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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any of these countries.6 20 Will honesty and transparency characterize
future competition enforcement? Industrial policy-if not complete "com-
mand and control"-has historically been central to the economies of
each.6 2 1 Will the exemptions that characterize each law (and which, in
fairness, also characterize the law of more mature regimes) provide license
for industrial policy to preempt competition? Will "national champions"
have a receptive audience within the agencies? Will the relevant legislation
be enforced impartially against domestic and foreign transactions and
conduct?
Earlier we suggested gradations between the few truly effective compe-
tition enforcement regimes and the many competition drones whose princi-
pal function is to attend international meetings. 6 22 Where will each of the
BRIC regimes find its place? Perhaps the Cornell Journal of International
Law will convene another symposium ten years hence to answer this
question.
620. See Tomas Hult, The BRIC Countries, GLOBAL EDGE BUSINESS REVIEW, 2009, http:/
/globaledge.msu.edu/newsAndViews/businessReviews/gBR%203-4.pdf.
621. See generally Patrizio Bianchi & Sandrine Labory, From "Old" Industrial Policy to
"New" Industrial Development Policies, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON INDUSTRIAL POL-
icy, at 3 (2006).
622. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.

